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RETHINKING LEGISLATIVE ADVOCACY
KIRSTEN MATOY CARLSON*
In an age of statutes, legislative advocates influence the substantive
content of almost every law. Yet scholars know very little about the role that
advocates play in shaping statutory law because the study of legislative
advocacy has been left to political scientists, who focus on the political rather
than the legal aspects of legislative lawmaking. This Article responds to this
gap in the literature by presenting an innovative, mixed methods approach
to studying legislative advocacy that brings law back into the study of
legislative advocacy and provides more accurate descriptions of how
legislative advocates behave. This legal approach to legislative advocacy
improves on the existing political science literature by emphasizing the
legislative process as a lawmaking enterprise and highlighting the
importance of the substantive content of statutory laws to legislative
advocates and their behavior. The Article demonstrates the utility of this
approach by presenting new empirical data on American Indian advocacy.
My analysis produces two important insights about legislative advocates’
behavior overlooked in previous studies. First, it reveals that advocates
perceive legislative advocacy to be about modifying the substantive content
of a proposed law. Legislative advocates take the law seriously as they
engage in nuanced and sophisticated strategies to interact with legislators
and other political actors to craft statutory laws. They advocate on a wide
range of proposed laws, shift their positions strategically throughout the
legislative process, and frequently seek to modify proposed laws. Second,
my account of Indian advocacy emphasizes that legislative advocacy involves
legal as well as political work. Indian advocates regularly used legal frames
and arguments to educate and persuade legislators to shape the law in ways
that better responded to their needs.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Americans spent $3.4 billion trying to influence legislative lawmaking
through lobbying in 2019 alone.1 Legislative advocacy continues to rise, with
1. Erin Duffin, Total Lobbying Spending in the United States from 1998 to 2019, STATISTA
(Mar. 4, 2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/257337/total-lobbying-spending-in-the-us/; Karl
Evers-Hillstrom, Lobbying Spending Reaches $3.4 Billion in 2018, Highest in 8 Years, OPEN
SECRETS (Jan. 25, 2019, 11:34 AM), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2019/01/lobbyingspending-reaches-3-4-billion-in-18/.
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lawyers frequently playing a role in the legislative process.2 Legislative
advocates influence every major—and almost every minor—piece of federal
legislation. They often draft portions of the laws that Congress enacts.3 Yet,
legal scholars have historically left the study of legislative advocacy to
political scientists and focused primarily on judicial advocacy.4
This Article argues that legal scholars need to reclaim the study of
legislative advocacy. It presents an innovative new approach to investigating
advocate behavior and demonstrates how this new approach produces more
accurate descriptions of legislative advocacy by examining American Indian
legislative advocacy. As Part II shows, the current division of labor leaves
legal scholars relying on political scientists to understand the role advocates
play in legislative lawmaking. From a legal perspective, political scientists’
understanding of legislative advocacy often appears incomplete and
underdeveloped. Political scientists emphasize the role of professional
lobbyists and downplay the importance of legislative lawyering in the
legislative process.5 They have produced important studies documenting
some of the political strategies, tactics, and arguments used by lobbyists. 6
But political scientists overlook many aspects of legislative advocacy

2. See BURDETT A. LOOMIS & WENDY J. SCHILLER, THE CONTEMPORARY CONGRESS 38 (4th
ed. 2004) (documenting a 300 percent increase in the number of registered lobbyists from 1981 to
2001—from 6,000 registered lobbyists in 1981 to 20,000 in 2001); see also JEFFREY M. BERRY &
CLYDE WILCOX, THE INTEREST GROUP SOCIETY 17–22 (5th ed. 2016) (documenting the increase
in lobbying over time more generally); Frank R. Baumgartner et al., Congressional and Presidential
Effects on the Demand for Lobbying, 64 POL. RSCH. Q. 3, 4 (2011) (documenting the same); Beth
L. Leech et al., Drawing Lobbyists to Washington: Government Activity and the Demand for
Advocacy, 58 POL. RSCH. Q. 19, 20 (2005) (documenting the same). Sociolegal studies confirm
that lawyers often play a role in legislative advocacy. See Gary Bellow, Steady Work: A
Practitioner’s Reflections on Political Lawyering, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 297, 304 (1996);
Scott L. Cummings & Douglas NeJaime, Lawyering for Marriage Equality, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1235,
1242 (2010); Deborah L. Rhode, Public Interest Law: The Movement at Midlife, 60 STAN. L. REV.
2027, 2046–48 (2008).
3. Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the Constitution, 64 STAN. L. REV. 191,
194 (2012).
4. See, e.g., Jarrod Shobe, Intertemporal Statutory Interpretation and the Evolution of
Legislative Drafting, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 807, 808–09 (2014).
5. A legislative lawyer is a lawyer who practices law in a political, advocacy context. Chai R.
Feldblum, The Art of Legislative Lawyering and the Six Circles Theory of Advocacy, 34 MCGEORGE
L. REV. 785, 786 (2003). In this Article, I use legislative advocacy to connote a wider range of
behaviors and concerns than that of professional lobbyists hired to represent clients. This broader
term more accurately describes the behavior I observed in my study, in which many of the advocates
were tribal leaders or leaders of tribal organizations rather than lobbyists.
6. For descriptions of lobbying activities, see, e.g., KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T.
TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1986); FRANK R.
BAUMGARTNER ET AL., LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE: WHO WINS, WHO LOSES, AND WHY 150
(2009).
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important to lawyers, legal scholars, and activists.7 Their studies often omit
discussions of the nuanced positions that legislative advocates take as they
draft legislative language and overlook how legislative advocates negotiate
the process to shape the law.8 Legislative advocates frequently use legal
frames and arguments to influence legislative lawmaking9 but political
science studies often underemphasize these discursive aspects of the
legislative process and overlook the often complicated ways that advocates
interact with other political actors in legislative lawmaking.
Lawyers, lawyer-lobbyists, legislative lawyers, and legal scholars have
long recognized the various roles that lawyers play in drafting legislation
and using the law to influence legislators, but few studies have thoroughly
investigated these behaviors.10 Recently, legal scholars have begun to
provide more nuanced accounts of legislative advocacy, but they have yet to
devise an approach to studying legislative advocacy across issues and
contexts from a legal perspective that fully addresses the gaps left by the
political science literature.11
Legal scholars and advocates deserve more accurate descriptions of how
advocates behave in the legislative process and influence legislative
lawmaking. Statutory law governs almost every aspect of modern life.12 In
an age of statutes, lawyers cannot affect legal change without understanding
the legislative process and the role of advocates within it. 13 Developing more
accurate descriptions of legislative advocates’ behavior is an important first
step toward understanding how, when, and why advocates influence
lawmaking. Without accurate descriptions of what legislative advocates do,
it is impossible to determine how, when, and why they influence legislators
and other political actors. Further, without more nuanced understandings of
the legislative process and how it can be used to change the law, lawyers may
overlook the legislative process as an alternative to judicial or administrative
processes in their law reform efforts.14
7. See infra Part II.
8. See infra Part II.
9. See, e.g., Deborah Dinner, The Divorce Bargain: The Fathers’ Rights Movement and
Family Inequalities, 102 VA. L. REV. 79, 112–17 (2013).
10. Shobe, supra note 4 (2014) (discussing the few studies empirically discussing legislative
drafting).
11. See supra Part II.
12. ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 3 (4th ed. 2015).
13. See, e.g., Feldblum, supra note 5, at 785–86 (noting the need for better instruction in
legislative lawmaking in law schools); Dakota S. Rudesill, Closing the Legislative Experience Gap:
How a Legislative Law Clerk Program Will Benefit the Legal Profession and Congress, 87 WASH.
U. L. REV. 699, 699–700 (2010) (arguing for a legislative internship program to remedy the lack of
legislative experience among U.S. lawyers).
14. Rudesill, supra note 13, at 708–09.
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Relying on a political science literature that does not consider questions
relevant to lawyers leads legal scholars, judges, and advocates to base their
legal analyses on incorrect or inaccurate assumptions about how the
legislative process and legislative advocacy works. Underdeveloped or
incorrect theories about the legislative process and how advocates influence
it undermines legal scholars’ and judges’ ability to formulate theories of
statutory interpretation, prescriptive recommendations for how the courts and
Congress can interact, and reforms to electoral, lobbying, and other laws.15
In short, good prescription depends on good description.
Part III responds to this need for more accurate information. It seeks to
improve on existing understandings of legislative advocacy by introducing
an innovative, mixed-methods approach to studying legislative advocacy
from a legal perspective. Unlike recent political science approaches, my
approach emphasizes that legislative advocacy occurs within an interactive,
discursive process that aims to make laws. Building on my previous work, I
combine theoretical and methodological insights from political science and
legal literatures in devising my approach.16 I take useful insights from the
political science literature on advocate strategies, positions, and tactics and
integrate them with legal scholars’ conceptualization of the legislative
process as an interactive and discursive lawmaking enterprise. Borrowing
from sociolegal studies of judicial advocacy,17 I emphasize how legislative
advocates employ the law—legal arguments, frameworks, and practices—in
the legislative process. By examining the various positions advocates take
and the arguments they make throughout the legislative process, my approach
facilitates an in-depth exploration of how advocates negotiate legislative
lawmaking and interact with legislators to craft the law through this dynamic
process.
The Article then demonstrates how my innovative approach provides a
more accurate description of advocate behavior by presenting new, empirical
data on American Indian advocacy. Part IV explains how I operationalized
my approach to conduct a study of American Indian advocacy. The study of
Indian advocacy facilitates a thorough investigation of legislative advocate
behavior. Most organized interests focus on a few issues,18 but Indian
15. Shobe, supra note 4, at 808–12 (discussing how inaccurate theories about legislatures harm
statutory interpretation).
16. Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Making Strategic Choices: How and Why Indian Groups Advocated
for Federal Recognition from 1977 to 2012, 51 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 930, 932 (2017); Kirsten Matoy
Carlson, Lobbying Against the Odds, 56 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 23, 52–55 (2019).
17. See infra Part III.
18. See, e.g., Frank R. Baumgartner & Beth L. Leech, Interest Niches and Policy Bandwagons:
Patterns of Interest Group Involvement in National Politics, 63 J. POLITICS 1191 (2001); JACK L.
WALKER, JR., MOBILIZING INTEREST GROUPS IN AMERICA (1991); William P. Browne, Organized
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advocates have a much broader agenda. They use myriad advocacy strategies
to advocate on subject matters of concern to the general public
(e.g., education, healthcare) as well as their interests as business owners
(e.g., employment, taxation, gaming) and governments (e.g., environmental
regulation, economic development, preservation of culture and language,
housing).19 Due to its breadth, Indian advocacy covers most of the issues
pursued by various interests across the United States. Thus, Indian advocacy
can be treated like a microcosm for better understanding legislative advocacy
within the United States more generally.20
Part V reveals how legislative advocates negotiate the legislative
process and interact with legislators and other political actors to craft legal
texts. It shows that advocates perceive legislative advocacy to be about
modifying the substantive content of a proposed law. Contrary to recent
political science studies, which have emphasized legislative advocates as
acting as either proponents or opponents to a proposed law,21 my data
demonstrate that advocates often have a third choice: to engage in the
lawmaking process to shape laws that better reflect their interests. Modifiers
do not simply engage in preference aggregation like many interest group
theories suggest advocates do.22 Rather, they advocate to change the
substance of the proposed law and focus on shaping the text.
Modifiers play an impressive role in the legislative process. Indian
advocates sought to modify 53% of the bills studied with over a quarter, 28%,
of all Indian advocates engaged in modification strategies.23 They sought to
shape legislative texts across a wide range of subject matters on general,
national policies (e.g., healthcare, education, and nuclear waste storage), tribe
specific issues (e.g., land claims and water rights settlements), and federal
Indian policy. These findings significantly broaden and enrich many political
science studies, which have focused more narrowly on major players
advocating on significant legislation. My work presents a wider view of
legislative advocacy, showing that some legislative advocates do not limit
their advocacy to major bills but attempt to shape a wide range of legislation

Interests and their Issue Niches: A Search for Pluralism in the Policy Domain, 52 J. POLITICS 477
(1990).
19. Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Lobbying as a Strategy for Tribal Resilience, 2018 BYU L. REV.
1159, 1173–74 (2018).
20. DAVID E. WILKINS & HEIDI KIIWETINEPINESIIK STARK, AMERICAN INDIAN POLITICS AND
THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM xxviii (3d ed. 2011).
21. See, e.g., BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 6, at 6–7.
22. For a discussion of interest group theories, see generally KENNETH GODWIN ET AL.,
LOBBYING AND POLICYMAKING: THE PUBLIC PURSUIT OF PRIVATE INTERESTS (2013).
23. See infra Part V.
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in sophisticated and nuanced ways.24 For example, American Indians have
sought to alter the content of bills affecting only one or a few tribes, to protect
or improve programs in general legislation, and to renegotiate federal Indian
policy.25
Taking modifiers into account uncovers the full range of strategies used,
positions taken, tactics employed, and arguments made by legislative
advocates. Legislative advocates employ a much broader range of positions
in trying to negotiate the legislative process than the binary
proponent/opponent model relied on in some recent political science studies.
Indian advocates utilized at least six different positions in their advocacy.
Based on these findings, I devise a more accurate typology of the different
positions taken by advocates in the legislative process.
Exploring this range of positions shows how advocates use the
legislative process to negotiate with other political actors to craft the law.
Contrary to recent political science studies, which describe legislative
advocates as having fixed positions, my data demonstrate how Indian
modifiers perceived their positions as relational and changeable throughout
the legislative process. Indian advocates often emphasized the drawbacks to
a bill as a way to negotiate for provisions within the legislation that more
accurately responded to their needs.
The various and changing positions taken by Indian advocates exposes
an important reality overlooked in most of the recent political science
literature: “legislative work is legal work.”26 Legislative advocates care
about legal texts and frequently use legal frames and arguments to shape
statutory law. American Indian proponents, opponents, and modifiers all
employed the law in their legislative advocacy to influence lawmakers.
While some utilized legal frames central to federal Indian law, like selfdetermination and the trust responsibility, others made cogent arguments
about how specific bills would conflict with or undermine existing laws. My
research demonstrates how advocates take the law and legal arguments
seriously as a part of legislative advocacy.
Part VI considers the significant implications of a legal approach to
studying legislative advocacy for key constituencies of American democracy.
For scholars of advocacy groups, my research demonstrates an innovative
methodology for studying legislative advocacy that produces richer accounts
of advocate behavior and its influence on lawmaking. For Indian nations and
advocacy groups more generally, the application of my approach
24. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 6, at 3 (studying the most active lobbying organizations
on a random sample of issues that generated more lobbying activity).
25. See infra Part V.
26. Rudesill, supra note 13, at 700.
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demonstrates how advocacy can be used broadly and in nuanced and
sophisticated ways to shape statutory law. This insight suggests that multiple
possibilities and pathways may exist for advocates to influence the creation
and development of the law.
II. UNDERSTANDING ADVOCATE BEHAVIOR IN THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
In this Part, I review the many important insights into the behavior of
legislative advocates produced by political scientists and explain how that
literature leaves unanswered important questions about how legislative
advocates craft statutes as legal texts.
Legal scholars have historically left the study of legislative advocacy to
political scientists.27 Political scientists ask questions about the political
aspects of legislative advocacy and seek to develop models that predict
political behaviors and outcomes.28 Their focus does not mirror that of
lawyers and legal scholars, who desire information on how to shape the law.29
Rather, political scientists seek to understand how interest groups influence
political outcomes; as a result, they have devoted considerable attention to
studying lobbying.
Political scientists have identified many of the basic strategies,
arguments, and tactics used by legislative advocates to achieve their goals.
They describe legislative advocates as sophisticated, strategic actors.30
Legislative advocates develop nuanced strategies by adapting to various
opportunities and constraints31 and may use the legislative process to pursue
goals other than policy enactment or failure.32
In terms of basic strategies, political scientists describe legislative
advocates as either defending the status quo or trying to change it. 33

27. See, e.g., Shobe, supra note 4, at 808–09.
28. See, e.g., GODWIN ET AL., supra note 22.
29. Edward L. Rubin, Law and the Methodology of Law, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 521, 522 (1997).
30. See, e.g., BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 6, at 126 (describing lobbyists as strategic
actors responding to various constraints).
31. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 6, at 78.
32. Some interest group scholars have observed that goals other than policy change may drive
lobbying behavior. GODWIN ET AL., supra note 22, at 203–05; BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note
6, at 195–98; David Lowery, Why Do Organized Interests Lobby? A Multi-Goal, Multi-Context
Theory of Lobbying, 39 POLITY 29, 29–30 (2007). These scholars suggest lobbyists have additional
motivations for lobbying, including leveraging institutional relationships. GODWIN ET AL., supra
note 22; Frederick J. Boehmke, Sean Gailmard, & John Wiggins Patty, Business as Usual: Interest
Group Access and Representation Across Policy-Making Venues, 33 J. PUB. POL’Y 3, 21 (2013)
(ensuring organizational survival); LOWERY, supra (building support for the issue, educating the
public, and developing credibility among congressional staffers).
33. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 6, at 61.
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Advocates make arguments based on their position on a bill.34 Political
scientists have identified the policy-based arguments made by advocates to
include the ease of implementation or feasibility, costs, ability of the bill to
achieve specific goals, and other consequences of enacting the bill.35
Common tactics used by lobbyists include engaging in direct contact with
members of Congress and their staffs, testifying at hearings, drafting
legislative language, mobilizing grassroots advocacy, and conducting public
education campaigns.36
Most political scientists agree that advocates influence the legislative
process by providing credible information to legislators and staffers about a
proposed law.37 Advocates strategically provide information to change or
reinforce legislators’ beliefs about legislative outcomes, the operational
effects of policies, and the electoral ramifications of their actions.38 But few
have investigated how these exchanges of information work on the ground.39
Some political scientists started to develop models that saw legislators and
advocates engaged in negotiation and persuasion,40 but recent studies have
shifted away from the discursive aspects of legislative lawmaking.
Recent political science studies have leveraged the increased
availability of data in the digital age to examine the efforts of major
participants from multiple organized interests on various issues or legislative
proposals.41 These studies often produce important insights into the behavior
of legislative advocates, but their findings often overlook the more nuanced
strategies, tactics, and arguments advocates use. For example, some recent
studies have described legislative advocacy strategies as binary. Legislative
advocates act as either proponents or opponents.42 Proponents, sometimes

34. Id. at 133–43.
35. Id. at 145 (listing different kinds of policy arguments made by lobbyists).
36. Id. at 150. For descriptions of lobbying activities, see, e.g., SCHLOZMAN & TIERNEY, supra
note 6, at 295–96.
37. See, e.g., GODWIN ET AL., supra note 22, at 5; JOHN R. WRIGHT, INTEREST GROUPS AND
CONGRESS: LOBBYING, CONTRIBUTIONS, AND INFLUENCE 75–97 (1996); BAUMGARTNER ET AL.,
supra note 6, at 65.
38. WRIGHT, supra note 37, at 75 (1996).
39. PAUL BURSTEIN, AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION, ADVOCACY, AND POLICY IN CONGRESS:
WHAT THE PUBLIC WANTS AND WHAT IT GETS 100 (2014) (“Very little is known about whether
individuals and organizations provide elected officials with the information they want or if the
information affects policy.”).
40. Richard A. Smith, Interest Group Influence in the U.S. Congress, 20 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 89,
98–104 (1995).
41. See, e.g., BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 6, at 6–7.
42. Id.; BURSTEIN, supra note 39, at 115. Not all interest group scholars frame their studies in
this binary manner. See, e.g., CHRISTINE MAHONEY, BRUSSELS VERSUS THE BELTWAY:
ADVOCACY IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 33 (2008) (noting that advocates
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called status quo challengers, seek to change law and policy. 43 Opponents,
or status quo defenders, are the adversaries of proponents. They seek to
defend the status quo by preventing changes to law and policy. Recent
studies report that the typical structure of a policy conflict has one proactive
side, the status quo challengers, and one opposition side, the status quo
defenders.44
These studies present important findings about the different tactics and
arguments used by status quo challengers and defenders but, in their efforts
to produce generalizable and parsimonious explanations, they overlook the
role of the law in these arguments and tactics. Few details are provided about
differences in tactics and arguments used by advocates on the same side. The
assumption seems to be that since the goal is the same––enactment or defeat
of the proposed law—advocates on the same side largely agree among
themselves about tactics, arguments, and positions. This simple model
overlooks the complexity of the interactions and negotiations that occur
within the legislative process and the role that legislative advocates play in
them. The focus on proponents and opponents obscures the more
complicated and nuanced positions that advocates may take in the legislative
process. Further, the rhetoric of proponents and opponents presupposes that
one side will win and the other will lose and perpetuates the idea that
legislative lawmaking is an all or nothing game. Laws, however, frequently
result from negotiations and provide benefits to more than one group.45
Advocacy groups may consider short term successes and incremental impacts
on the details of a proposed law as important wins. As earlier political
science studies emphasized, “the ability to have an impact on the details of a
policy is not in the least a trivial form of influence.”46 Recent political
science studies, however, have overlooked this important fact. By
take different positions, including promoting, modifying, or blocking a proposal); see SCHLOZMAN
& TIERNEY, supra note 6.
43. See, e.g., BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 6, at 6–7; BURSTEIN, supra note 39, at 115.
44. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 6, at 61.
45. Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Positive Political Dimensions of Regulatory Reform, 72 WASH.
U. L. Q. 1, 32–33 (1994) (“But what interest group theories of legislation suppose is the norm––a
victorious interest group capturing the statute . . . ––is more likely the exception, rather than the
rule. One searches in vain for many instances in which we can confidently describe a regulatory
statute as the creation of a particular interest group. Much more common are those statutes that
represent a combination of interest group pressures filtered through legislative processes and
ameliorated through the struggle within the legislature and with legislators and their constituents,
all of which results in a statute with multiple winners and losers.”) (internal citations omitted).
46. SCHLOZMAN & TIERNEY, supra note 6, at 311 (suggesting that “[o]n the contrary, one of
the axioms of policy analysis is that to know what a piece of legislation actually does, it is important
to look beyond its broad purposes to the particulars; it is the details that specify such critical matters
as when the measure is to take effect, whom it covers, how much is to be spent, and who has what
authority to implement it.”).
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oversimplifying wins and losses as policy enactment or failure, they may
obscure the nuanced relationships that may develop between advocates and
legislators as they negotiate the substantive content of laws.
Recent political science studies provide a big picture view of legislative
advocacy, but in doing so, they often overlook how advocates use the law to
negotiate the legislative process. By focusing on how advocates build
coalitions and aggregate preferences, they underemphasize the fact that
legislative advocacy produces substantive legal texts. As lawyers, lawyerlobbyists, and legal scholars have noted, legislative advocacy includes
making constitutional, statutory, and other legal arguments, drafting statutory
language and amendments to statutory language, and conducting legal
research to support arguments for or against proposed laws.47 Recent
political science studies emphasize that legislative advocacy is normative in
that advocates take positions for or against proposed laws, but they limit their
discussion of the arguments used by advocates to policy arguments and
overlook how advocates use arguments to construct meanings and laws.48
Legislative advocates may rely on legal arguments and frameworks to
construct these meanings and shape the law, but political scientists have yet
to examine this aspect of legislative advocate behavior.
Political scientists have made considerable contributions to
understanding the behavior of legislative advocates, but they understate the
legal nature of the legislative process and fall short of providing lawyers,
lobbyists, and legal scholars with nuanced and accurate descriptions of how
legislative lawmaking actually works.49 As a result, legal scholars have
lamented that lawyers, legal scholars, and judges lack in-depth knowledge
about the legislative process and the role that advocates play in it.50
47. ALAN K. CHEN & SCOTT L. CUMMINGS, PUBLIC INTEREST LAWYERING: A
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 259 (2013).
48. See, e.g., BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 6, at 145.
49. See, e.g., Shobe, supra note 4, at 808–09; Victoria Nourse, Misunderstanding Congress:
Statutory Interpretation, the Supermajoritarian Difficulty, and the Separation of Powers, 99 GEO.
L.J. 1119, 1122, 1125 (2011).
50. See, e.g., Shobe, supra note 4, at 808–12 (discussing how inaccurate theories about
legislatures harm statutory interpretation); William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Frills Textualism, 119
HARV. L. REV. 2041, 2073 (2006) (reviewing ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY
(2006)) (noting that younger scholars do not have a deep grounding in legislative processes);
Nourse, supra note 49, at 1125 (arguing that three dominant theories of statutory interpretation rely
on misguided views of the legislative process); Rudesill, supra note 13, at 700–01 (lamenting the
lack of legislative work experience among lawyers and noting what new lawyers need to learn about
the legislative process). Federal judges have also lamented the lack of knowledge that federal judges
in general have about the legislative process. See, e.g., Abner J. Mikva, Reading and Writing
Statutes, 28 S. TEX. L. REV. 181, 183 (1986); James L. Buckley, Introduction of Discussion Subject
and Panelists, in Proceedings of the Forty-Ninth Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia
Circuit, 124 F.R.D. 241, 313 (1989); Frank M. Coffin, The Federalist Number 86: On Relations
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Despite the gaps in the political science literature, legal scholars have
historically paid less attention to the study of legislative advocacy.51 Some
legal scholars have developed case studies of legislative advocacy leading to
the enactment of important state or federal laws.52 These legislative histories
tend to characterize the legislative process as interactive and deliberative.53
They highlight the complicated nature of the process, including how it
proceeds in stages.54 Each stage provides some opportunities, albeit different
ones, for legislative advocacy.55
Legislative advocates engage in
negotiations with other stakeholders and legislators throughout the process.56
Advocates and political actors have to make calculated decisions about what
can be achieved in the process now and what has to be pursued over the long

Between the Judiciary and Congress, in JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS: TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL
COMITY 21, 22 (Robert A. Katzmann ed., 1988).
51. Legal scholars have focused more on normative discussions of statutory law and have
generated descriptions, critiques, and evaluations of existing laws as well as proscriptive arguments
about what the law should be. Recently, a few scholars have advocated for law schools to take
legislative advocacy more seriously. See, e.g., Feldblum, supra note 5, at 785–87; Rudesill, supra
note 13, at 699. Legal scholars have also started to investigate the legislative drafting process and
how it relates to statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman,
Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting,
Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 905 (2013); Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa
Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional
Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725, 728 (2014); Victoria F.
Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (2002).
52. Brayden G. King et al., Winning Woman Suffrage One Step at a Time: Social Movements
and the Logic of the Legislative Process, 83 SOC. FORCES 1211, 1214 (2005); Chai R. Feldblum &
Robin Appleberry, Legislatures, Agencies, Courts, and Advocates: How Laws Are Made,
Interpreted, and Modified, in THE WORK AND FAMILY HANDBOOK: MULTI-DISCIPLINARY
PERSPECTIVES, METHODS, AND APPROACHES 627, 633–35 (Marcie Pitt-Catsouphes et al. eds.,
2006).
53. See, e.g., Feldblum & Appleberry, supra note 52, at 627–50; Bethany R. Berger, United
States v. Lara as a Story of Native Agency, 40 TULSA L. REV. 5, 11–13 (2004); Neta Ziv, Cause
Lawyers, Clients, and the State: Congress as a Forum for Cause Lawyering during the Enactment
of the Americans with Disabilities Act, in CAUSE LAWYERING AND THE S TATE IN A GLOBAL ERA
211, 212 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 2001).
54. Textbook descriptions of the legislative process describe a bill as proceeding through
several stages on the way to enactment. Simplified versions of the legislative process detail these
stages as: drafting of the bill, introduction of the bill by a member of Congress in the House, referral
to a House committee, committee consideration and action, scheduling floor action in the House,
floor action in the House, referral to the Senate, referral to a standing committee, committee
consideration and action, referral to conference committee, and presentment to the President.
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 23–34 (2d ed.
2006). See also MIKVA & LANE, supra note 12.
55. King et al., supra note 52, at 1214; Feldblum & Appleberry, supra note 52, at 633–35.
56. Feldblum & Appleberry, supra note 52, at 633–35.
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term.57 They may change their preferences based on these political realities.58
These studies highlight the fluidity of the legislative process and how that
fluidity encourages advocates to act relationally and reflexively to maximize
their influence over the legislative text. These studies provide important
insights into the legislative process and how advocates engage with
legislators in it, but most of them either focus on the development of one bill
or a few related bills or describe the activities of a single advocacy group.59
They do not attempt to describe legislative advocate behavior across a range
of bills or advocacy groups and the generalizability of their findings remains
unknown.
Legal scholars have started to integrate investigations of legislative
advocacy into their studies of advocacy more generally.60 These scholars
frequently borrow from and situate their examinations of legislative
advocacy within sociolegal studies on judicial advocacy.61 Unlike political
scientists, sociolegal scholars study how advocates use the rhetorical
57. Berger, supra note 53, at 12 (explaining that tribal advocates and their legislative champions
initially settled for a Duro Fix with a sunset provision because it was better than no Duro Fix at all
and they knew they would continue to advocate for a permanent one).
58. Some legal scholars view the legislative process as relational and reflexive. Ziv, supra note
53, at 212. Political actors may enter the legislative process with predetermined interests, but those
interests change as the legislative initiative proceeds, “through the constant interaction with other
codeliberators who partake in this process.” Id. An evolving process of dialogues, negotiations,
and deliberations among advocacy groups, staffers, and members of Congress translates the various
interests held by each into law. Id. at 213 (“The ‘interest’—an abstract idea that leads groups to
initiate a political move—breaks down into a series of dialogues, negotiations, and deliberations.
Each one proceeds through the legislative process through the formation of diverse alliances and
relations—within the social group acting for legislative reform, between the group and its
representatives, between those representatives and key players in the state apparatus, and vice
versa.”).
59. Dinner, supra note 9, at 80; Berger, supra note 53, at 12.
60. See, e.g., Carlson, Making Strategic Choices, supra note 16, at 932; Scott L. Cummings &
Douglas NeJaime, Lawyering for Marriage Equality, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1235, 1242 (2010); Michael
McCann & William Haltom, Alta Shrugged: Why Personal Injury Lawyers Are Not Public
Defenders of Their Own Causes, in THE WORLDS CAUSE LAWYERS MAKE: STRUCTURE AND
AGENCY IN LEGAL PRACTICE 433–38 (Austin Sarat ed., 2005); HOLLY J. MCCAMMON, THE U.S.
WOMEN’S JURY MOVEMENTS AND STRATEGIC ADAPTATION: A MORE JUST VERDICT 12 (2012);
Stephen L. Wasby, Litigation and Lobbying as Complementary Strategies for Civil Rights, in
LEGACIES OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (Bernard Grofman ed., 2000).
61. See generally MICHAEL MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE
POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION (1994); GORDON SILVERSTEIN, LAW’S ALLURE: HOW LAW
SHAPES, CONSTRAINS, SAVES, AND KILLS POLITICS (2009); Wasby, supra note 60; Cummings &
NeJaime, supra note 60, at 1247–56. Sociolegal studies investigate how and why groups use the
law as a political and strategic resource to challenge the status quo, change institutional rules, and
redistribute power. See generally STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS,
PUBLIC POLICY, AND P OLITICAL CHANGE (1975); MCCANN, supra note 61; JOEL F. HANDLER,
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A THEORY OF LAW REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE
(1978); Scott L. Cummings & Deborah L. Rhode, Public Interest Litigation: Insights from Theory
and Practice, 36 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 603, 605 (2009).
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resources of the law—legal arguments, frameworks, and practices—to argue
for social change.62 But most sociolegal studies continue to emphasize
litigation strategies rather than legislative advocacy. A few studies have
sought to determine whether, when, and how legislative advocates employ
the law in legislative contexts.63 But legal scholars have yet to develop a
legal approach to studying legislative advocacy across issues and contexts
that fills the gaps left by political science studies.
Legal scholars, lawyers, and advocates need more accurate descriptions
of legislative advocacy to improve their ability to change the law through the
legislative process64 and to develop better theories of statutory interpretation
and separation of powers.65 Despite the juricentrism in most law schools,
litigation is not the only way to resolve legal problems.66 The legislative
process often provides a viable alternative but lawyers cannot effectively use
it to help their clients if they either do not see it as another way to change the
law or do not know how to use it.67 Similarly, a lack of knowledge of the
legislative process and how advocates influence it undermines legal scholars’
abilities to craft theories about how Congress should relate to courts and
agencies.68 The next Part proposes a legal approach to studying legislative
advocacy that will provide legal scholars and lawyers with more nuanced
descriptions of the legislative process as a lawmaking enterprise.
III. EMPIRICALLY INVESTIGATING LEGISLATIVE ADVOCATE BEHAVIOR: A
LEGAL APPROACH
This Part combines insights from the political science and legal
literatures to devise an innovative, mixed methods approach to studying the
behavior of legislative advocates. This approach responds to the political
science literature’s failure to view legislative advocacy as legal work. It
treats advocates as sophisticated actors engaged in nuanced behaviors to
shape the law and emphasizes the interactive aspects of the legislative
process.

62. See generally HANDLER, supra note 61; MCCANN, supra note 61; GERALD ROSENBERG,
THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991); SILVERSTEIN, LAW’S
ALLURE, supra note 61; HELENA SILVERSTEIN, UNLEASHING RIGHTS: LAW, MEANING, AND THE
ANIMAL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1996); Reva Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the Constitution
from a Social Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297, 303–04 (2001).
63. Carlson, Making Strategic Choices, supra note 16, at 932.
64. Rudesill, supra note 13, at 709.
65. Nourse, supra note 49, at 1122–36.
66. Rudesill, supra note 13, at 709; CHEN & CUMMINGS, supra note 47, at 201–02.
67. Rudesill, supra note 13, at 709–10; Feldblum, supra note 5, at 785–86.
68. Nourse, supra note 49, at 1122.
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In devising this new approach, I start from the premise, shared by many
political scientists and legal scholars, that the legislative process is complex
and interactive.69 I emphasize that the purpose of this complicated process is
to make laws.
Like other legal scholars, I conceptualize advocacy as a prescriptive
enterprise, in which advocates interpret and critique existing laws and
policies and then propose recommendations to legal decisionmakers.70 In
short, advocates are strategic actors seeking prescriptive goals within an
interactive and discursive legislative process.
I take useful insights from the political science literature on advocate
strategies, positions, and tactics and integrate them with this
conceptualization of the legislative process as an interactive and discursive
lawmaking enterprise. By highlighting the interactive and discursive nature
of the legislative process, my approach facilitates an in-depth exploration of
how advocates use different strategies, positions, and tactics to negotiate and
interact with legislators to craft different kinds of compromises across a range
of issues on proposed legislation. Once a wider range of strategies, positions,
and tactics is identified, I examine how legislative advocates employ the
law—legal arguments, frameworks, and practices—in the legislative process.
Borrowing from sociolegal scholars studying judicial advocacy, my approach
investigates how legislative advocates use the law.71 Like sociolegal
scholars, I emphasize the role of law in advocacy strategies, perceiving the
law to be a resource that may be employed in legal and political struggles 72
and as “constantly constructed and reconstructed through human
interaction.”73 My approach thus investigates how legislative advocates use
the law to construct meanings and provides a better understanding of the
modes of discourse that advocates employ in making arguments.
My approach improves upon existing approaches in several ways. First,
by integrating insights from the political science and legal literatures, my
approach provides a more accurate description of advocate behavior.
Political scientists have explored the strategies and positions taken by
legislative advocates, but they tend to oversimplify them by emphasizing
their binary nature.74 My approach moves beyond this binary view by
69. Ziv, supra note 53, at 212.
70. See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 29, at 522.
71. See generally HANDLER, supra note 61; MCCANN, supra note 61; SILVERSTEIN, LAW’S
ALLURE, supra note 61; SILVERSTEIN, UNLEASHING RIGHTS, supra note 62.
72. HANDLER, supra note 61; MCCANN, supra note 61; SILVERSTEIN, UNLEASHING RIGHTS
supra note 62.
73. Jeb Barnes & Thomas F. Burke, Making Way: Legal Mobilization, Organizational
Response, and Wheelchair Access, 46 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 167, 168 (2012).
74. See, e.g., BAUMGARTNER, ET AL., supra note 6, at 6–7; BURSTEIN, supra note 39, at 115.
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contextualizing legislative advocacy as part of a fluid, relational, and
interactive process for making the law. Adopting this view of the legislative
process suggests that advocate strategies and positions may be more nuanced
and flexible than recent political science studies have indicated. Legislative
advocates, even ones working together towards either enactment or nonenactment of a proposed law, may vary in terms of positions, tactics, and
arguments. While they may agree on a desired, final outcome, they may
disagree on how to get there or what changes they want made to the proposed
law first. Further, advocates constantly engage with one another, legislators,
legislative staffers, and other political actors throughout the legislative
process. Their strategies and positions may change over time as a result of
these interactions. Contextualizing legislative advocacy as part of an
interactive process facilitates investigation into variation among advocates in
their strategies, positions, arguments, and tactics over time and provides a
more accurate description of legislative advocate behavior.
Second, my approach allows for deeper investigations into the
legislative process as a series of negotiations about the content of the law.
My approach expands on earlier political science studies that sought to
integrate “the study of law and legal reasoning with more analytic and
explanatory approaches to the study of” legislative politics.75 By focusing on
how legislative advocates build coalitions and aggregate preferences in the
legislative process, recent political science studies have understated
advocates’ attempts to influence the content of the law. As legal scholars
have long emphasized, legislative advocates take positions and make
arguments to negotiate statutory language.76
Legislative advocates
frequently do this through texts (for example, committee hearings, reports,
and draft bills), but political scientists rarely analyze these texts. Analyzing
these texts allows for examination of how legislators and advocates interact
and negotiate lawmaking as an enterprise in meaning making and text
creation.
Third, my approach facilitates an in-depth analysis of how legislative
advocates use the law to argue for and against specific proposed bills.
Sociolegal scholars have long documented how advocates employ legal
frames and arguments in judicial processes,77 but few have considered the
role that law plays in legislative advocacy. Building upon my previous
work,78 my approach extends this research into the legislative arena by
75. John Ferejohn, Law, Legislation, and Positive Political Theory, in MODERN POLITICAL
ECONOMY: OLD TOPICS, NEW DIRECTIONS 192 (Jeffrey S. Banks & Eric A. Hanushek, eds., 1995).
76. CHEN & CUMMINGS, supra note 47, at 259.
77. See, e.g., SILVERSTEIN, LAW’S ALLURE, supra note 61; Siegel, supra note 62, at 303.
78. Carlson, Making Strategic Choices, supra note 16, at 931.
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adding interpretive and textual analysis to an examination of targeted
advocacy on specific proposed laws.79 A more in-depth analysis of texts
facilitates the identification and exploration of the legal frames and
arguments used by legislative advocates. My approach brings law back into
the study of legislative advocacy and allows for investigation into how, when,
and why legislative advocates utilize the law.
Finally, my approach models a way for scholars to devise more complex
understandings of advocate behavior in legislative lawmaking. Like recent
political science studies that examine advocacy across a range of issues, it
allows for the development of insights that are applicable across a number of
contexts and can be used to formulate some generalizable insights about how
legislative advocates behave.80 My approach, however, improves upon these
studies by incorporating interpretative and textual analyses that provide more
nuanced understandings of how advocates use the law to negotiate with
legislators and other political actors to craft laws. As a result, my approach
starts to answer questions that recent political science studies have
overlooked yet are important to lawyers, advocates, and legal scholars.
IV. STUDYING AMERICAN INDIAN LEGISLATIVE ADVOCACY
This Part describes how I operationalized my approach and used it to
conduct a study of legislative advocacy by American Indians over time. It
explains the research design, case selection, data collection, and limitations
to the study.
A. Research Design
Legislative advocacy by American Indians is the object of my study for
a variety of reasons. American Indians, and especially Indian nations, have
a long and rich history of engaging with the United States government. 81
Indian nations have employed a variety of advocacy strategies over the past
five centuries from declaring war on the United States to sending delegations
79. Previous scholars pioneered a methodology for examination of targeted advocacy on
proposed laws. BURSTEIN, supra note 39, at 102–03.
80. See, e.g., BURSTEIN, supra note 39, at 115; BAUMGARTER, ET AL., supra note 6, at 6–7.
81. See generally FREDRICK E. HOXIE, THIS INDIAN COUNTRY: AMERICAN INDIAN ACTIVISTS
AND THE PLACE THEY MADE (2013); EDWARD LAZARUS, BLACK HILLS/WHITE JUSTICE : THE
SIOUX NATION VERSUS THE UNITED STATES, 1775 TO THE PRESENT (1991) (documenting over two
decades of Sioux advocacy for a congressional act authorizing the bringing of the Black Hills claim
in federal court); W. DALE MASON, INDIAN GAMING: TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY AND AMERICAN
POLITICS 40 (2000); see also Daniel Carpenter, On the Emergence of the Administrative Petition:
Innovations in Nineteenth-Century Indigenous North America, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW FROM THE
INSIDE OUT: ESSAYS ON THEMES IN THE WORK OF JERRY L. MASHAW 349 (Nicholas R. Parrillo
ed., 2017).
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to Congress and the White House to occupying the Bureau of Indian
Affairs.82 Indian nations advocate on a wide range of issues from land and
natural resources to health care and education to language and culture.
Scholars have increasingly studied this advocacy and have produced studies
on individual Indians as voters in mainstream elections,83 Indian protest
movements after World War II,84 campaign contributions made by Indian
nations involved in gaming enterprises,85 and Indian engagement in state and
local politics.86
This study builds on the few existing studies on American Indian
legislative advocacy.87 Early studies on the relationship between Congress
and American Indians found that Indian-related legislation falls into three
categories: (1) pan-tribal legislation, which has an overriding purpose of
developing federal Indian policy by addressing an issue faced by all Indian
nations or citizens of Indian nations; (2) tribe specific legislation, which does
not seek to establish general federal Indian law or policy but addresses a
specific issue for one or a few but not all tribes; and (3) general legislation,
which has a main substantive focus other than Indians (such as health,
education, employment, etc.) but specifically mentions Indians or Indian
tribes.88 Indian advocates have supported legislation across these three
categories, suggesting that Indian advocates do not just target their advocacy
82. Robert Odawi Porter, Tribal Disobedience, 11 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 137, 138–47 (2006);
Carlson, Lobbying Against the Odds, supra note 16, at 29–35.
83. See, e.g., DANIEL MCCOOL, ET AL., NATIVE VOTE: AMERICAN INDIANS, THE VOTING
RIGHTS ACT, AND THE RIGHT TO VOTE (2007); LAUGHLIN MCDONALD, AMERICAN INDIANS AND
THE FIGHT FOR EQUAL VOTING RIGHTS (2011).
84. See generally DANIEL M. COBB, NATIVE ACTIVISM IN COLD WAR AMERICA: THE
STRUGGLE FOR SOVEREIGNTY (2008); PAUL CHAAT SMITH & ROBERT ALLEN WARRIOR, LIKE A
HURRICANE: THE INDIAN MOVEMENT FROM ALCATRAZ TO WOUNDED KNEE (1996); JOANE
NAGEL, AMERICAN INDIAN ETHNIC RENEWAL: RED POWER AND THE RESURGENCE OF IDENTITY
AND CULTURE (1996).
85. See, e.g., Fredrick J. Boehmke & Richard Witmer, Indian Nations as Interest Groups:
Tribal Motivations for Contributions to U.S. Senators, 65 POL. RSCH. Q. 179, 179–81 (2012); Jeff
J. Corntassel & Richard C. Witmer, II, American Indian Tribal Government Support of OfficeSeekers: Findings from the 1994 Election, 34 SOC. SCI. J. 511, 514–22 (1997).
86. See, e.g., Corntassel & Witmer, supra note 85; LAURA E. EVANS, POWER FROM
POWERLESSNESS: TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS, INSTITUTIONAL NICHES, AND AMERICAN FEDERALISM
(2011); KENNETH N. HANSEN & TRACY A. SKOPEK, THE NEW POLITICS OF INDIAN GAMING: THE
RISE OF RESERVATION INTEREST GROUPS (2015); W. DALE MASON, supra note 81; Fredrick J.
Boehmke & Richard Witmer, State Lobbying Registrations by Native American Tribes, 2015 POL.,
GROUPS & IDENTITIES 2 (2015); Raymond Foxworth, et al., Incorporating Native American History
into the Curriculum, 96 SOC. SCI. QUARTERLY 955 (2015).
87. Carlson, Making Strategic Choices, supra note 16, at 938; Carlson, Lobbying as a Strategy
for Tribal Resilience, supra note 19, at 1174–1220; Richard Witmer & Frederick J. Boehmke,
American Indian Political Incorporation in the Post-Indian Gaming Regulatory Act Era, 44 SOC.
SCI. J. 127, 129 (2007).
88. CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW 10–11 (1987).
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towards bills creating federal Indian policy but also advocate on a broad
range of bills and subject matters.89 The wide range of subject matters and
kinds of legislation that Indian nations and organizations advocate on serves
as a microcosm for understanding American politics more generally and
facilitates a thorough investigation of advocate behavior in a legislative
setting. Moreover, while this study emphasizes Indian advocacy, my data
include non-Indian witnesses, many of whom act similarly to Indian
advocates.90 This suggests that my findings may extend beyond Indian
advocates to legislative advocates more generally.
Existing studies on American Indian legislative advocacy have focused
on Indian advocates as proponents of legal change.91 In my own previous
research, I have distinguished between offensive strategies—used by
proponents to support a legal change—and defensive strategies—used by
opponents against a legal change—and documented that American Indians
employ both kinds.92 But neither my work, nor any other study that I am
aware of, broadly explores the behavior of Indian nations and organizations
in their legislative advocacy.
This study examines American Indian advocacy on Indian-related bills
starting at the committee hearing stage of the legislative process and with a
particular focus on committee hearing testimony. I chose committee
testimony for several reasons. First, scholars have found that legislative
advocates have more influence in the earlier stages of the legislative
process.93 Committee hearings are early in the legislative process and they
provide advocates with an opportunity to engage in targeted advocacy on
specific proposed laws.94 Many legislative advocates testify at hearings
because they deem it an important activity, and they widely use testimony to
access and influence lawmakers.95 Second, advocacy groups employ
89. Most organized interests advocate on one or a few issues. See, e.g., Frank R. Baumgartner
& Beth L. Leech, Interest Niches and Policy Bandwagons: Patterns of Interest Group Involvement
in National Politics, 63 JOURNAL OF POLITICS 1191 (2001); JACK L. WALKER, JR., MOBILIZING
INTEREST GROUPS IN AMERICA (1991); William P. Browne, Organized Interests and their Issue
Niches: A Search for Pluralism in the Policy Domain, 52 JOURNAL OF POLITICS 477 (1990). In
contrast, American Indians testify on a wide range of bills and subject matters. See infra Part IV.
90. See, e.g., Hearings before the H. Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights on H.R.
3112, An Act to Amend the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Part I, 97th Cong. (May 27-28, 1981 and
June 3, 1981) (demonstrating that non-Indian advocates take positions and make arguments similar
to the ones identified used by Indian advocates in this study).
91. Berger, supra note 53, at 12; Carlson, Making Strategic Choices, supra note 16, at 938;
Carlson, Lobbying as a Strategy for Tribal Resilience, supra note 19, at 1174–20.
92. Carlson, Lobbying as a Strategy for Tribal Resilience, supra note 19, at 1174.
93. King, et al., supra note 52, at 1214.
94. BURSTEIN, supra note 39, at 104. As a result, “individuals and organizations invited to
testify at congressional hearings may legitimately feel that their testimony will have an impact.” Id.
95. SCHLOTZMAN & TIERNEY, supra note 6, at 295.
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hearings to gain access to lawmakers, to present carefully reasoned
arguments and technical information, and to shape the legislative record in
ways that may help them later in legislative, judicial, and administrative
processes.96 Hearings provide advocacy groups with a public forum in which
to make their arguments and sometimes increase publicity about proposed
legislation.97 Third, committee hearings present an opportunity for targeted
advocacy on a specific legislative proposal and allow for the linking of
advocacy to a particular legislative proposal.98 By linking advocacy to a
specific legislative proposal, the hearing data allow for examination of the
impact of that advocacy on the legislative outcome (enactment or nonenactment) of the legislative proposal. Moreover, the textual nature of
hearings facilitates the tracking and comparison of legislative arguments and
texts over time, which reveal the extent to which legislators adopt language
proposed by advocates.
I used a mixed methods approach to investigate how and why American
Indians advocated to influence legislative lawmaking. Borrowing from the
political science literature, I use quantitative data to provide a big picture
view of advocate behavior. Qualitative analysis supplements and enriches
the quantitative data. It ensures that the big picture view does not obscure
important details about how advocates behave in legislative settings. This
mixed methods approach navigates a middle ground between nongeneralizable case studies and political science studies that produce
generalizable insights but sacrifice nuance.
B. Methodology
I used quantitative methods to identify, describe, and compare the
advocacy strategies that Indian nations and organizations used as witnesses
testifying at committee hearings on specific proposed laws during two
congressional sessions. Consistent with previous studies,99 I expected to find
that Indian advocates more frequently testified in favor of bills than against
them.100 I investigated this expectation by coding the witnesses testifying for
and against each bill in the dataset and then looking at the frequencies of
proponents and opponents across all Indian-related bills.
I accessed primary data on advocacy by American Indians from several
sources, including a database of Indian-related bills,101 publicly available and
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 296.
Id.
BURSTEIN, supra note 39, at 104.
BAUMGARTER, ET AL., supra note 6, at 6–7; BURSTEIN, supra note 39, at 115.
BAUMGARTER, ET AL., supra note 6, at 6–7; BURSTEIN, supra note 39, at 115.
Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Congress and Indians, 86 U. COLO. L. REV. 78, 95 (2015).
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archival materials on legislation introduced in Congress,102 and interviews
with advocates for American Indian nations and organizations. I examined a
sample of congressional hearings held on Indian-related bills during two
congressional sessions.103 The two congressional sessions—the 97th and
106th—were selected because they reflected variation in several important
variables, including the party in control of Congress, enactment rate, and
enactment rate by bill type.
I developed a database including all legislative hearings held by
Congress on each of the 821 Indian -related bills in the two congressional
sessions to measure Indian advocacy, including tribal support and opposition.
Committee hearings present an opportunity to study targeted advocacy on a
specific legislative proposal and, thus, allowed me to measure Indian support
for and opposition to proposed legislation. I reviewed the hearings to
determine whether any Indian witnesses testified. I defined an Indian witness
as any witness explicitly identifying as an Indian, Alaska Native, or Native
Hawaiian, or testifying on behalf of an Indian tribe, an Indian nonprofit
organization, a tribal consortium, a tribal business, and/or an Alaska forprofit or nonprofit corporation.104 When a hearing included at least one
Indian witness, I coded all the testimony (every witness) in the hearing. The
total number of witnesses coded was 2,137.105 If the hearing did not include
any Indian witnesses, it was not coded because it did not include any Indian
advocacy. Of the 821 bills, 204, or 25%, had hearings. 106 Of the 204 bills
with hearings, half, 54% (110), included testimony from an Indian witness.
I coded all the witnesses in each legislative hearing with an Indian
witness, including the oral statements, responses to questions, and written
statements.107 I coded each witness by the witness’s affiliation (e.g., tribe,
102. I conducted research on Indian-related bills with files retained by the Senate Committee on
Indian Affairs and the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs at the Center for Legislative
Archives. I also reviewed files on or related to legislation in the National Congress of American
Indians archives (1933–1990) at the Smithsonian National Museum of the American Indian
Archives Center.
103. The original database included 7799 Indian-related bills introduced in the 94th through the
112th Congresses. Carlson, Congress and Indians, supra note 101, at 95–98.
104. Representatives of state, local, or federal agencies (for example, the Bureau of Indian
Affairs) were not counted as Indian witnesses even if the witness identified as Indian and spoke to
the Indian issues in the bill because the witness was not representing Indians. For similar reasons,
I also excluded friends of the Indians, for example, non-profits that seek to assist Indians but are not
made up of Indians, such as the Friends Committee on National Legislation.
105. There are no issues of intercoder reliability because the same coder coded all the hearings
in the two Congresses.
106. On average, committees hold hearings on only one-sixth of all bills introduced. ESKRIDGE,
ET AL., supra note 54, at 25.
107. The position of each witness, whether Indian or non-Indian, was coded. For a similar
coding scheme, see BURSTEIN, supra note 39, at 134–43.
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tribal consortium, state, etc.);108 the witness’s position on the bill (for, for but
raises issues, against, against but prefers alternative, no position); 109 and the
committee holding the hearing.
This coding scheme allowed me to identify and analyze the different
strategies and positions that Indian witnesses took on each bill.110 I
aggregated the positions taken by Indian witnesses on the bills into three
categories: (1) proponents, who were for the bill and wanted it enacted; (2)
opponents, who were against the bill and wanted it defeated; and (3)
modifiers, who wanted to amend the bill.111 Each bill was already coded by
bill number, Congress, title, date of introduction, bill progress, enactment,
type of legislation, and subject matter.112
I then conducted a more substantial, qualitative review of the legislative
histories of each bill. This review included a close reading of the hearing
testimony to determine the grounds upon which witnesses supported,
opposed, or wanted the bill modified; to identify any amendments made to
the bills after the hearing process, including whether the bill was combined
with another bill or superseded either by a substitute, related, or companion
bill; and to check to see if any of the bills were miscoded.113 I also gathered
other committee hearings, committee reports, debates on the floor, and
archival materials on the bill where available.114 I used textual analysis to
compare the language in various versions of a bill to determine whether and

108. I coded witnesses into the following affiliations: tribe, tribal consortium, Indian non-profit
association, tribal business, Indian individual, Alaska for profit corporation, Alaska non-profit
corporation, Native Hawaiian, non-Indian organization, federal agency, White House, state
government, member of Congress, individual, and other. Detailed information on the coding of
these affiliations is available from the author upon request.
109. I coded each of these positions as follows: (1) For: the witness indicated that they were in
favor of the bill and wanted it enacted without any changes to it; (2) For, but raises issues: the
witness stated that they supported the bill, but suggested changes it; (3) Against: the witness opposed
the enactment of the bill and did not ask for any changes to it; (4) Against, but prefers an alternative:
the witness indicated opposition to the bill and suggested amendments or alternatives to it; and (5)
No position: the witness did not take a position on the bill.
110. BURSTEIN, supra note 39, at 134–40.
111. The modifier category includes all the witnesses requesting changes to the bill and
originally coded as either “for, raises issues” or “against, prefers alternative.”
112. For a full discussion of the coding of the bills in the database, see Carlson, Congress and
Indians, supra note 101, at Appendix 1.
113. I checked the initial coding to ensure that none of the bills had been miscoded due to actions
taken by Congress after the hearing.
114. Not all of these materials were available for each bill. Some bills never progressed beyond
the hearings stage, so no committee reports, or floor debates exist for them. The availability of
archival and supplemental materials also varied by bill. Archival materials were only available for
the bills in the 97th Congress. Supplemental materials existed on some, but not all bills, in both the
97th and 106th Congresses.
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how arguments made by advocates at hearings were incorporated into
specific bills.
I used an interpretive approach in reviewing the congressional
testimony. An interpretative approach seeks “to understand how specific
human beings in particular times and locales make sense of their worlds.”115
I employed this approach to develop an understanding more sensitive to that
of the advocates themselves of what they expressed they were doing in
pursuing a particular position and to situate their strategies, positions, and
arguments in the larger political and social context.116 I closely read
congressional testimony and archival materials, when available, to identify
Indian advocates’ strategies, positions, and arguments and their motivations
and goals for using that strategy, taking that position, or making that
argument. I investigated the discourses used by Indian advocates in
congressional testimony on a specific legislative proposal. I traced the
interactions and negotiations among advocates and lawmakers over time to
observe how advocates use different strategies, tactics, and arguments to
negotiate compromises across a range of bills with varying subject matters.
As a result, I was able to gain a deeper understanding of how negotiations
among advocates and legislators developed and changed over time as they
crafted specific laws.
C. Limitations
Several limitations exist to this study. First, the data only represent
legislative advocacy at committee hearings, one of multiple stages in the
legislative process.117 Testimony given at congressional hearings reflects
only a small part of legislative advocacy. They do not represent the full
record of advocacy on a bill, which would include informal contacts and
letters to members of Congress. I addressed this issue by drawing on
supplemental data sources, such as archival materials or interviews, to
augment the hearing data and provide a more complete picture of the
advocacy effort.
Committee hearings also may reflect more the preferences of the
committee than the advocacy of the witness.118 Some Indian nations and
115. PEREGRINE SCHWARTZ-SHEA AND DEVORA YANOW, INTERPRETIVE RESEARCH DESIGN:
CONCEPTS AND PROCESSES 10 (2012).
116. Robert Adcock, Generalization in Comparative and Historical Social Science: The
Difference that Interpretivism Makes, in INTERPRETATION AND METHOD: EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
METHODS AND THE INTERPRETIVE TURN 91 (Dvora Yanow and Peregrine Schwartz-Shea eds., 2d
ed. 2014).
117. For a description of the stages in the legislative process, see supra note 54 and
accompanying text.
118. BURSTEIN, supra note 39, at 104.
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organizations may not have been able to testify at committee hearings due to
the costs and time involved—even if the Committee invited them to testify.
To address these concerns, I reviewed both solicited and unsolicited
testimony by Indian advocates at committee hearings and used additional
sources to confirm my findings.
Second, this study only explores Indian advocacy within the era of
Tribal Self-Determination. It presents snapshots of Indian advocacy during
this period because it only includes data from two Congresses. While efforts
were made to select a cross-section of Congresses,119 my data may not
represent all the advocacy strategies used by Indian advocates over time.
A third limit to this study is that it does not attempt to evaluate fully or
systematically the effects of American Indian advocacy. While that question
is important and merits close investigation, this study has a more limited
purpose: to provide a more accurate description of advocate behavior. It
seeks to identify and examine strategies, positions, and arguments used by
Indian advocates. It only makes preliminary insights into the influence of
American Indian advocacy on legislative outcomes by determining the extent
to which the changes requested by Indian advocates were incorporated into
enacted laws.120
V. NEGOTIATING THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: AMERICAN INDIAN
LEGISLATIVE ADVOCACY
This Part uses the approach described in Part IV to provide a more
accurate description of how American Indian advocates behaved and used
the law in the legislative process during the 97th and 106th Congresses. My
data reveal that legislative advocates perceive the legislative process to be
about modifying the substantive content of a proposed law. They often
negotiate the legislative process by targeting and framing their advocacy in
nuanced ways and employing the rhetoric of the law—legal frames and
arguments—to shape legislation.
American Indian advocates, like advocacy groups generally, regularly
testified on proposed federal laws related to their interests. Of the 2,137
witnesses on the 110 bills coded, 45%, were Indian advocates.121 Interest
group studies have found that organized interests in general comprise 35.5%
119. See supra Part IV.B.
120. I preliminarily measure influence in this study by comparing the changes requested by
Indian advocates with the amendments made to the bill and the text of the final bill as enacted.
Future articles will investigate the relationship between advocacy and influence more thoroughly.
Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Beyond Descriptive Representation: American Indian Opposition to
Federal Legislation (forthcoming).
121. Over one-third, 37% (355 out of 954), of these Indian advocates represented Indian nations.
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of all witnesses on federal bills so Indian advocates may be more likely to
testify on bills that affect them.122 Other witnesses testifying on Indianrelated bills have affiliations similar to those testifying on federal legislation
generally.123 They included non-Indian organizations, federal agencies, state
government officials, members of Congress, and non-Indian individuals.
Figure 1 displays the breakdown of witnesses testifying on Indian-related
bills by organizational affiliation.124

Figure 1: Witnesses Testifying on Indian-related Bills by
Organizational Affiliation
Witness Affiliation
Indians

Percentage
45%
(954)

Non-Indian organizations

22%
(476)

Federal agencies

7%
(142)

State governments

11%
(238)

Members of Congress

4%
(97)

Non-Indian Individuals

9%
(187)

Other

2%
(39)

Number of witnesses = 2137

122. BURSTEIN, supra note 39, at 103.
123. Id.
124. In comparison to a general study of advocacy on federal legislation, Indian-related bills
generate more testimony from state or local governments and federal agencies and less advocacy
from members of Congress, non-Indian individuals, and interest organizations. Burstein, supra note
39, at 103.
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Indian advocates engaged in a wide range of advocacy strategies to
shape the law as they negotiated the legislative process. Similar to interest
groups, American Indians regularly testified in support of bills that they
favored and against bills that they did not want to see enacted.125 As Figure
2 shows, half of Indian witnesses were proponents. In contrast, only 20% of
Indian witnesses acted as opponents.
Contrary to recent studies, which have emphasized legislative advocates
as acting as either proponents or opponents,126 my data reveal that Indian
advocates often had a third choice: to engage in the lawmaking process to
shape laws that better reflect their interests. Modifiers differ from both
proponents and opponents in the positions they take, arguments they make,
and tactics they use in the legislative process. Perceiving the legislative
process as interactive and negotiable, Indian modifiers sought to educate
members of Congress and craft bills that better responded to their concerns
and interests. Over a quarter, 28%, of Indian witnesses sought to modify bills
in their testimony.
Figure 2: Indian Witnesses by Position Taken on Indian-related Bills in
Percentages
Position
Proponent

Percentage of Indian Witnesses
50%
(479)

Opponent

20%
(192)

Modifiers

28%
(268)

No position

2%
(17)

Number of witnesses = 954

125. See, e.g., BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 6, at 58; BURSTEIN, supra note 39, at 115,
143–45.
126. See, e.g., BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 6, at 6–7; BURSTEIN, supra note 39, at 115,
143–45.
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As Figure 3 shows, Indian modifiers testified on over half, 53%, of the
bills in the dataset. The proponent, opponent, and modification strategies
used by Indian advocates is discussed below.
Figure 3. Positions of Indian Witnesses by Bill in Percentages

Proponents

Percentage of Bills
71%
(77)

Opponents

21%
(23)

Modifiers

53%
(57)

Number of bills = 108*
*Indian witnesses did not take positions on two bills in the dataset so they
are not included. The numbers do not add up to 108 because multiple
Indian witnesses testified on most bills and they rarely all took the same
position.
A. Proponents
As expected, and consistent with earlier studies of interest group
behavior, Indian witnesses testified in support of proposed laws more
frequently than they opposed them.127 Indian advocates testified for 71% and
used a unified proponent strategy on 37% of the bills in the 97th and 106th
Congresses.128 They supported bills on various subject matters, including
youth, claims, culture, economic development, education, federal recognition
of Indian groups, health care, lands, and natural resources. Indian advocates
most frequently testified only in support of tribe specific bills dealing with
claims, lands, and/or natural resources.
As my previous research shows, Indian proponents have used legislative
advocacy to protect their tribal sovereignty, build their institutions, and
maintain control over their lands and natural resources.129 Indian nations
127. BAUMGARTNER, ET AL., supra note 6, at 6–7; BURSTEIN, supra note 39, at 115.
128. I generated the percentage of bills with only proponents by dividing the number of bills
with only proponents (40) by all the bills in the dataset (108).
129. Carlson, Lobbying as a Strategy for Tribal Resilience, supra note 19, at 1163. For a fuller
discussion of how tribal proponents have employed legislative strategies to protect tribal
sovereignty, see id. at 1177–20.
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have advanced tribal sovereignty by initiating new policies, reversing court
decisions, and encouraging the oversight and implementation of existing
policies.130
Indian proponents acted remarkably like other proponents.131 Like other
status quo challengers, Indian proponents proposed and drafted legislation.132
Indian advocates initiated every bill that they supported in the Congresses
studied.
Some Indian nations and organizations drafted the bill
themselves,133 while others proposed legislation as part of a larger
coalition.134 Similar to proponents more generally, Indian proponents
worked closely with members of Congress and their staffs on legislative
language,135 mobilized the public to support their efforts,136 and emphasized
positive arguments for changing the law in their testimony.137

130. Id. at 1174.
131. For a discussion of how proponents behave, see supra Part II.
132. See, e.g., 1981–82 Miscellaneous Tax Bills, XVI: Hearing on S. 1298 Before the Subcomm.
on Taxation and Debt Mgmt. of the S. Comm. on Fin. 97th Cong. 86 (July 19, 1982) (statement of
Barry E. Snyder, President, Seneca Indian Nation) (explaining that the Association on American
Indian Affairs instigated the drafting of the original bill).
133. Id.
134. Tribes frequently proposed land claims and water rights settlements as part of a coalition.
See, e.g., Hearing before the S. Comm. on Indian Affs. on S. 2102, Timbisha Shoshone Homeland
Act, 106 Cong. (Mar. 21, 2000) (explaining that the bill emerged out of negotiations between the
National Park Service, the Tribe, and other federal agencies).
135. See, e.g., Carlson, Lobbying as a Strategy for Tribal Resilience, supra note 19, at 1202–08
(describing how Indian nations worked with Senator Evans to ensure that a tribal self-governance
demonstration project was added to the ISDEAA Amendments of 1988).
136. For example, the Texas Kickapoo Tribe galvanized support among the Oklahoma Kickapoo
Tribe and local churches in their efforts to obtain federal recognition and lands. See, e.g., Hearings
before the H. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affs. on H.R. 4496, Confirming the Citizenship Status
of the Texas Band of Kickapoo Indians, 97th Cong. (Oct. 30, 1981 and Aug. 5, 1982).
137. For example, Indian tribes argued that Indian Tribal Government Tax Status Act of 1982
was essential to the realization of tribal self-determination. 1981–82 Miscellaneous Tax Bills, XVI:
Hearing on S. 1298 Before the Subcomm. on Tax’n and Debt Mgmt. of the S. Comm. on Fin. 97th
Cong. 71–72 (July 19, 1982) (statement of Delbert Frank, Sr., Chairman, Confederated Tribes of
the Warm Springs Reservation) (“This legislation is extremely important to all Indian tribal
governments.”), id. at 136 (statement of the National Congress of American Indians); consistent
with recent federal legislation recognizing tribes as separate sovereigns, id. at 72 (statement of
Delbert Frank, Sr., Chairman, Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation), and
necessary to ensure equal treatment for state and tribal governments in the United States. Id. at 73
(statement of Delbert Frank, Sr., Chairman, Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation);
id. at 139 (statement of the National Congress of American Indians); id. at 131 (statement of Darrell
“Chip” Wadena, Minnesota Chippewa Tribe); id. at 132 (statement of W. Richard West, Jr.,
Association on American Indian Affairs). At the same time, they pointed out that the bill would not
lead to a significant revenue loss to the United States. Id. at 139–40 (statement of the National
Congress of American Indians).
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B. Opponents
Indian advocates testified against 21%, but only uniformly opposed 3%
of the bills with Indian testimony in the 97th and 106th Congresses.138
Similar to other opponents, they used an opposition strategy to prevent the
bill’s enactment and protect the status quo.139 Most often, Indian advocates
opposed the proposed federal law because they thought it would harm the
interests of the tribe or Indian people.140 Indian advocates employed
opposition strategies to defeat bills that would limit Indian gaming under the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act,141 extinguish Indian land claims,142
undermine protections for subsistence practices of Native peoples,143 allow

138. I generated the percentage of bills with only opponents by dividing the number of bills with
only opponents (3) by all the bills in the dataset (108). The three bills that Indian witnesses
uniformly opposed are the Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 2000, H.R. 3125, 106th Cong.
(2000), the Steelhead Protection Act, 97th Cong. (1981), and the Indian Land Consolidation Act
Amendments of 2000, 106th Cong. (1999). Hearing before the Subcomm. on Telecomm., Trade,
and Consumer Prot. of the H. Comm. on Com. on H.R. 3125, Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of
2000, 106th Cong. (June 15, 2000); Hearing before the S. Comm. on Indian Affs. on S. 984, the
Steelhead Trout Prot. Act, Part I, 97th Cong. (June 29, 1981); Joint Hearing before the S. Comm.
on Indian Affs. and the H. Comm. on Res. on S. 1586, Indian Land Consolidation Act Amendments
of 2000, 106th Cong. (Nov. 4, 1999).
139. BAUMGARTNER, ET AL., supra note 6, at 115 (describing how opponents seek to protect the
status quo).
140. See, e.g., Hearing before the Subcomm. on Telecom., Trade, and Consumer Prot. of the H.
Comm. on Com. on H.R. 3125, 106th Cong. 59-61 (June 15, 2000) (statement of Richard Williams,
Chairman, Lac Vieux Desert Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians); Hearing before the S.
Comm. on Indian Affs. on S. 984, the Steelhead Trout Prot. Act, Part I, 97th Cong. (June 29, 1981);
Hearing before the S. Comm. on Indian Affs. on the Ancient Indian Land Claims Settlement Act, S.
2084, 97th Cong. (June 23, 1982); Hearing before the Sen. Comm. on Indian Affs. on Alaska Native
Claims Technical Amendments Act of 1999, S. 2214, 106th Cong. (Mar. 31, 1982) (statement of Guvo District of the Tohono O’odham Nation); Hearing before the S. Comm. on Energy and Nat. Res.
on the Alaska Native Claims Technical Amendments Act of 1999, S. 1702, 106th Cong. (Oct. 14,
1999) (statement of the Alaska Inter-Tribal Council); Hearing before the S. Comm. on Indian Affs.
on the Indian Gaming Regulatory Improvement Act of 1999, S. 399, 106 Cong. (Mar. 24, 1999)
(statement of Montie Deer, Chairman, National Indian Gaming Commission); Hearing before the
H. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affs. on the Tribal-State Compact Act of 1981, H.R. 5001, 97th
Cong. (Mar. 18, 1982) (statement of the American Indian Law Center).
141. Hearing before the Subcomm. on Telecomm., Trade, and Consumer Prot. of the H. Comm.
on Com. on H.R. 3125, 106th Cong. 59-61 (June 15, 2000) (statement of Richard Williams,
Chairman, Lac Vieux Desert Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians); Hearing before the S.
Comm. on Indian Affs. on the Indian Gaming Regulatory Improvement Act of 1999, S. 399, 106
Cong. (Mar. 24, 1999).
142. Hearing before the S. Comm. on Indian Affs. on the Ancient Indian Land Claims Settlement
Act, S. 2084, 97th Cong. (June 23, 1982).
143. Hearing before the S. Comm. on Energy and Nat. Res. on the Alaska Native Claims
Technical Amendments Act of 1999, S. 1702, 106th Cong. (Oct. 14, 1999) (statement of the Alaska
Inter-Tribal Council).
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for drilling for oil on sacred lands,144 and abrogate treaty fishing rights.145
Indian advocates also cited the lack of a need for the legislation in explaining
their opposition to bills.146 Indian advocates used opposition strategies to
defeat tribe specific bills, pan-tribal bills, and general bills that affected their
interests.
In opposing these bills, Indian opponents engaged in tactics and made
arguments typical of other opponents seeking to protect the status quo. As
previous studies have shown, opponents focus on the shortcomings of the
proposed law, highlighting how much it costs and how it will not solve the
targeted problem.147 Similarly, Indian advocates who opposed a bill
discredited the proponent’s arguments by emphasizing how these bills would
violate existing federal laws and tribal rights. Like other opponents, they also
raised fears about the bills’ potential impacts on tribal and other
communities.148
The Steelhead Trout Protection Act demonstrates how Indian nations
and organizations opposing a bill with the singular goal of defeating the bill
acted like other opponents.149 The Act would have decommercialized
steelhead trout, designated it as a national game fish, and made commercial
interstate transportation of the fish illegal under federal law.150 It would also
have abrogated treaties between the federal government and Indian nations
by applying state laws and regulations governing the harvest, transportation,

144. Hearing before the Sen. Comm. on Indian Affs. on Alaska Native Claims Technical
Amendments Act of 1999, S. 2214, 106th Cong. (Mar. 31, 1982) (statement of Gu-vo District of the
Tohono O’odham Nation).
145. Hearing before the S. Comm. on Indian Affs. on S. 984, the Steelhead Trout Protection Act,
Part I, 97th Cong. (June 29, 1981).
146. See, e.g., Hearing before the H. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs on the Tribal-State
Compact Act of 1981, H.R. 5001, 97th Cong. (Mar. 18, 1982) (statement of the American Indian
Law Center); Hearing before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs on S. 5108, Indian Tribal Justice
Technical and Legal Assistance Act of 2000, 106 Cong. (Sept. 29, 1999) (statement of the Navajo
Nation).
147. BAUMGARTNER, ET AL., supra note 6, at 138 (explaining that status quo defenders “[r]aise
doubts and fears, especially about cost to government, costs to private sector actors, and the
feasibility of any government solution to what is probably an exaggerated problem in any case” and
that status quo defenders “need not explain the benefits of the status quo, they need only cast doubt
on the policy alternatives being proposed.”). The study also considered the influence of advocacy
group opposition on policymaking and found that it was not a predictor of policy success or failure.
Id. at 76; see also Burstein, supra note 39, at 148 (listing arguments made by opponents to federal
legislation).
148. Id. at 138.
149. Steelhead Trout Protection Act, S. 874, 97th Cong. (1981). A related bill to the Steelhead
Trout Protection Act, H.R. 2978, was introduced in the House, but the House never held a hearing
on the bill.
150. Id.
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and sale of steelhead trout to Indian fishermen exercising their treaty rights.151
Twenty-six Indian witnesses opposed the proposed law.152 Seventeen Indian
nations and eight tribal organizations testified against the Steelhead Trout
Protection Act at the hearing held by the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs
in June 1981.153 None of these Indian nations and organizations sought to
amend the bill.154 Instead, they mobilized to defeat the bill.155
Tribes opposed the bill because it would unilaterally abrogate their
treaty rights to fish commercially even though the Supreme Court had
repeatedly upheld these rights.156 Rather than offer amendments, Indian
151. Id.
152. Hearing before the S. Comm. on Indian Affs. on S. 874, the Steelhead Trout Protection Act,
Part I, 97th Cong. (June 29, 1981) [hereinafter Hearing on S. 874, Part I].
153. Id. The seventeen Indian nations that testified against the bill are: Makah Indian Tribe,
Quinault Indian Nation, Nez Perce Tribe, Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs Reservation,
Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation, Tulalip Tribes of Washington, Quileute
Indian Tribe, Swinomish Indian Tribal Community, Upper Skagit Indian Tribe, Sauk-Suiattle Indian
Tribe, Lummi Indian Nation, Hoh Tribe, Nisqually Tribe of Washington State, Muckleshoot Indian
Tribe, Puyallup Tribe of Washington, Confederated Tribes of Umatilla Indians, and Ak-Chin Indian
Community. The eight tribal organizations that opposed the bill are: Point No Point Treaty Council,
Point Elliot Treaty Council and Fisheries Manager, Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission,
Northwest Indian Fisheries Commission, Quinault Treaty Area, Skagit System Cooperative,
Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission, and the National Tribal Chairmen’s Association.
Many reiterated their opposition to the bill at the second hearing held in September 1981. Hearing
before the S. Comm. on Indian Affs. on S. 874, Part II, 97th Cong. (Sept. 28, 1981) [hereinafter
Hearing on S. 874, Part II].
154. See generally Hearing before the S. Comm. on Indian Affs. on S. 874, Part I, 97th Cong.
(June 29, 1981); Hearing before the S. Comm. on Indian Affs. on S. 874, Part II, 97th Cong. (Sept.
28, 1981).
155. Id. Several Indian nations and organizations also submitted letters to Senators to reiterate
their opposition to the bill. See, e.g., Letter from Gilbert King George, Chairman, Muckleshoot
Tribal Council to Senator John Melcher, March, 16, 1982, National Archives, The Center for
Legislative Archives, Senate Committee on Indian Affairs files on S. 874 (asking for the Senator’s
support in opposing S. 874); Letter from Elmer Savilla, Executive Director, National Tribal
Chairman’s Association to Senator John Melcher, Feb. 1, 1982, National Archives, The Center for
Legislative Archives, Senate Committee on Indian Affairs files on S. 874 (adamantly opposing S.
874 because it “is intended as a direct abrogation of Pacific Northwest Indian commercial fishing
rights so that sportsman may enjoy sole access to this steelhead resource.”); Letter from the National
Congress of American Indians to Senator John Melcher, Feb. 8, 1982, National Archives, The
Center for Legislative Archives, Senate Committee on Indian Affairs files on S. 874 (stating that
every American Indian tribe in the United States opposes S. 874 because the bill “would directly
abrogate Pacific Northwest Indian tribal fishing rights upheld twice by the Supreme Court in the
last decade.”).
156. See, e.g. Hearing on S. 874, Part II, supra note 153, at 104 (statement of Chris Morganroth,
Quileute Tribe); id. at 68–69 (statement of Billy Frank, Jr., Northwest Indian Fisheries
Commission); id. at 141 (statement of Mary K. Leitka, Chairwoman, Hoh Indian Tribe); Hearing
before the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs on S. 874, Part I, 97th Cong. 62 (June 29, 1981)
(statement of Gary Peterson, Point No Point Treaty Council); id. at 66 (statement of Dale Johnson,
Makah Treaty Area, Northwest Indian Fish Commission). Many of the tribes emphasized their
reliance on fishing for economic, spiritual, and cultural purposes. See, e.g., Hearing. on S. 874,
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nations and organizations revealed the misleading statistics and arguments
relied on by the state of Washington and other supporters of the bill and
attempted to correct the record.157 They emphasized how the bill would
Part II, supra note 153, at 98–99 (Sept. 28, 1981) (statement of Joe DeLaCruz, Quinault Nation);
id. at 69 (statement of Billy Frank, Jr., Northwest Indian Fisheries Commission) (“For some tribes,
steelhead serve as the ‘bread and butter’ salmon, the main source of income. For all tribes, steelhead
and salmon are essential in sustaining the cultural and traditional life of the Pacific Northwest
Indians.”); Hearing on S. 874, Part I, supra note 152, at 65 (June 29, 1981) (statement of Tony
Forsman, Chairman, Point Elliot Treaty Council and Fisheries Manager) (“The treaty right to
harvest steelhead is not for sale, and it cannot be bought. It is clear that steelhead is necessary for
the survival of Indian tribes. For no amount of money will tribes trade that survival. No amount of
money could compensate for the loss suffered by decommercializing steelhead. Tribal fishermen do
not want to be paid not to fish. They do not seek welfare. They want to fish.”); id. at 66 (statement
of Dale Johnson, Makah Treaty Area, Northwest Indian Fish Commission) (“The Makah people
have been dependent on fishing since time immemorial. Today, fishing is still the most important
livelihood for our people.”); id. at 80 (statement of Nelson Wallulatum, Confederated Tribes of the
Warm Springs Reservation) (“Taking steelhead, like taking salmon, is at the heart of Warm Springs
culture. We are river people and we are fishermen. Catching these fish is not sport or recreation. It
is our way of life.”).
157. See, e.g., Hearing on S. 874, Part II, supra note 153 (statement of Joe DeLaCruz, Quinault
Nation) (presenting detailed statistics on treaty fishing in Washington state); id. at 110–21
(statement of Chris Morganroth, Quileute Tribe) (same); id. at 69 (statement of Billy Frank, Jr.,
Northwest Indian Fisheries Commission) (rejecting contentions that the bill is necessary for
conservation); Hearing on S. 874, Part I, supra note 152 (statement of Dale Johnson, Makah Treaty
Area, Northwest Indian Fish Commission) (same). The hearings were acrimonious. Some tribes
accused Senator Gorton of selling out to special interests and used strong language to voice their
displeasure, including that they were furious, found the bill and proceedings distasteful and a waste
of money, and perceived the bill to be a political device by Senators and interest groups. See, e.g.,
Hearing before the S. Comm. on Indian Affs. on S. 874, Part I, 97th Cong. 66 (June 29, 1981)
(statement of Tony Forsman, Squamish Tribe) (calling out Slade Gorton for introducing legislation
to abrogate tribal treaty rights after saying he would abide by the Supreme Court’s decision);
Hearing before the S. Comm. on Indian Affs. on S. 874, Part II, 97th Cong. 69 (Sept. 28, 1981)
(statement of Dale Johnson, Makah Treaty Area, Northwest Indian Fish Commission) (“Now we
see that the man [Slade Gorton] who led an unsuccessful crusade to beat us in court wants to exploit
our lack of political power in Congress so his constituency can take the fish which were guaranteed
to us by the United States by solemn promises made on the treaty grounds.”); id. at 69 (statement
of Billy Frank, Jr., Northwest Indian Fisheries Commission) (“Your bill, Mr. Chairman [Slade
Gorton], is another attempt to abrogate the treaties between the United States and tribal
governments.”); id. at 97 (statement of Joe DeLaCruz, Quinault Nation) (“Arguments supporting
the bill are fraught with . . . misrepresentation. As an example, consider the statement that was made
by you, Mr. Chairman [Slade Gorton], in the introduction of S. 874, which contains highly
misleading statistics that are apparently intended to deceive the public and the Congress, in thinking
that Indians are overfishing the resource because they may account for more than 50 percent of the
catch taken from certain rivers.”). Others noted their frustration with the attempt of a special interest
to abrogate their treaty rights. See, e.g., Hearing. on S. 874, Part I, supra note 152 (statement of
Dale Johnson, Makah Treaty Area, Northwest Indian Fish Commission) (noting that “a vocal and
well-financed minority has been clamoring to take away our rights for years” and that “this bill is
just the latest in a long line of bills supported by this lobby and introduced to steal our rights.”); id.
at 68 (statement of Joe DeLaCruz, Quinault Nation) (“I find it extremely distasteful and
objectionable to have to participate in this process. I have appeared . . . not out of choice, but out
of necessity. The anger and dismay of my people over the shameful attempt to benefit the recreation
of a few sportsmen by breaking the treaty promises made to our forefathers deserves to be heard.”).
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violate the law by abrogating treaty rights and would express congressional
bad faith towards Indians.158 The Senate Committee on Indian Affairs chose
not to take further action on the bill, and the bill never made it out of
committee.159
The Steelhead Trout Protection Act is one example of how Indian
nations and organizations used an opposition strategy to defeat a bill that they
felt undermined their rights. It illustrates how Indian advocates strongly and
uniformly oppose proposed legislation that threatens their sovereign rights.160
If Congress had enacted the Steelhead Trout Protection Act, it would have
undermined tribal sovereignty, abrogated treaty fishing rights, dramatically
altered existing federal Indian law, and devastated tribal economies.161 In
response, Indian nations and organizations mobilized to defeat the threat.
They sought to protect the status quo to prevent major changes to existing
laws that recognized and protected their sovereignty. Not all of the bills in
the dataset generated as much opposition as the Steelhead Trout Protection
Act. But the arguments made by Indian nations and organizations against the
bill resemble both the kinds of arguments made by opponents generally and
by other Indian opponents seeking to protect the status quo and defeat a
proposed law.
C. Modifiers
Modifiers illuminate how legislative advocates perceive the legislative
process to be about changing the substantive law. Rather than either support
or oppose a proposed law, advocates can—and do—seek to modify its
158. Hearing on Indian Affs. on S. 874, Part I, supra note 152, at 63–65 (statement of Tony
Forsman, Chairman, Point Elliot Treaty Council and Fisheries Manager); id. at 65 (statement of
Tony Forsman, Squamish Tribe) (“The Tribe, in opposing this steelhead legislation are firmly
convinced that this bill is a direct abrogation of treaty rights, and refuse that money be traded for
this right.”); id. at 66 (statement of Dale Johnson, Makah Treaty Area, Northwest Indian Fish
Commission) (describing the legislation as abrogating the Makah peoples’ treaty rights to benefit
sportsmen); id. at 77 (statement of A.K. Scott, Nez Perce Tribal Chairman) (“That Congress is even
considering this legislation is an outrage. This proposed act is a violation of lawful principles and
legal rights.”); id. at 79-80 (statement of Nelson Wallulatum, Confederated Tribes of the Warm
Springs Reservation) (“The Warm Springs Tribe, however, considers this a treaty abrogation bill
and we are unalterably opposed to it. When our ancestors signed the treaty of 1855 they reserved
for our people the right to fish at our usual and accustomed stations beyond the reservation.”).
159. Similar bills introduced in the 99th Congress experienced a similar fate, dying in committee.
Steelhead Trout Protection Act, H.R. 2136, 99th Cong. (1985); Steelhead Trout Protection Act, S.
954, 99th Cong. (1985).
160. See supra note 138 for a list of other bills that Indian nations and organizations opposed
because the bill would harm their rights.
161. See generally Hearing on S. 874, Part II, supra note 153 (Sept. 28, 1981) (statement of
Indian nations and organizations); Hearing on S. 874, Part I, supra note 152 (statement of Indian
nations and organizations); Hearing before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs on S. 692, 106th Cong.
(June 9, 1999) (statement of Indian nations and organizations).
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provisions. Modifiers express neither unqualified support for nor unqualified
opposition to the bill.162 Rather, modifiers seek to influence the substantive
content of the bill. Contrary to recent political science studies, which
downplay the existence of modifiers,163 Indian witnesses used modification
strategies on 53% of the bills studied.
Modification strategies differ from both proponent and opponent
strategies in the positions taken, arguments made, and tactics used by the
legislative advocates pursuing them. Modifiers often perceive their goals as
more incremental than either opponents or proponents because they seek to
educate members of Congress and influence the bill’s content. Their
advocacy appears more fluid and relational, as they sometimes change their
position on the bill throughout the course of the legislative process. Indian
modifiers often targeted provisions of the bill most relevant to them or used
the legislative process to negotiate the terms of federal Indian law and policy
more generally. As a result, the behavior of modifiers often differed from
and appeared to be more strategic and complicated than that of either
proponents or opponents.
1. Why American Indians Use Modification Strategies
Most frequently, Indian advocates used a modification strategy because
they wanted to improve the law so that it better served American Indians.164
162. Modifiers used different rhetoric than proponents or opponents. For example, while
opponents outright opposed a bill, modifiers often focused on changing the bill to better reflect
Indian interests. Some even indicated their support for the general concept of the bill, but then
raised strong concerns about specific provisions in the legislation. See, e.g., Hearings before the S.
Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources on S. 2305, The Federal Royalty Management Act of
1982, 97th Cong. 400 (May 8 and 17, 1982) (statement of Patricia Brown, Three Affiliated Tribes
of the Fort Berthold Reservation) (testifying that the tribe supported changing the royalty
management system but wanted to see Section 20 removed from the bill); Hearing before the H.
Comm. on Resources on H.R. 701, the Conservation and Reinvestment Act, 106th Cong. 59 (June
12, 1999) (statement of Leslie Ramirez, Attorney, on behalf of Pueblo Santa Ana) (indicating that
tribe supported the bill in theory but recommended that Title II and III of the legislation be amended
to provide grants to Indian Tribes without any cost match or in the alternative to make the maximum
cost share requirement for Indian tribes to be twenty-five percent).
163. See, e.g., BAUMGARTNER, ET AL., supra note 6, at 6–7; BURSTEIN, supra note 39, at 115.
164. See, e.g., Hearing before the Subcomm. on Human Resources of the H. Comm. on Education
and Labor on H.R. 3046, Older Americans Act Amendments of 1981, 97th Cong. (April 29, 1981)
(statement of the National Congress of American Indians) (requesting that Congress amend the bill
to remove certain barriers to participation for Indian elders); Hearing before the H. Comm. on
Resources on H.R. 701, the Conservation and Reinvestment Act, 106th Cong. (June 12, 1999)
(statement of Leslie Ramirez, Attorney, on behalf of Pueblo Santa Ana) (recommending that Title
II and III of the legislation be amended to provide grants to Indian Tribes without any cost match
or, in the alternative, to make the maximum cost share requirement for Indian tribes to be twentyfive percent); Hearing before the H. Comm. on Resources on H.R. 798, the Resources 2000 Act,
106th Cong. (June 12, 1999) (Leslie Ramirez, Attorney, on behalf of Pueblo Santa Ana) (requesting
that the amount allocated to tribes be increased to twenty percent of the total and that the maximum
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Indian advocates sought to improve all three kinds of Indian-related bills—
pan-tribal, tribe specific, and general. Indian modifiers provided information
on Indian experiences that enabled legislators to enact laws more responsive
to the conditions in Indian country. They frequently suggested alternative
language or ideas, sometimes even draft amendments, during the hearings.165
As discussed in more detail below, Indian advocates varied in their
commitments to the suggestions they made. Some refused to support the bill
unless their proposed changes were incorporated into it while others would
have supported the bill even if the changes they proposed were rejected.
As modifiers, Indian advocates could—and often did—provide
information to Congress about proposed laws on which they were not major
stakeholders.166 They employed modification strategies to negotiate for
language and/or provisions that they preferred on bills that affected regional
or national policies. Unlike proponents and opponents, Indian advocates
frequently did not express a strong position in favor of or against a general
bill, but rather targeted their advocacy to educate members of Congress about
how specific provisions of the bill would affect them and could be improved
to serve them better.
Indian advocates identified multiple ways that Congress could respond
more effectively to conditions on the ground in Indian country. Some of their
suggestions included Congress increasing funding available to Indians for
programs,167 refining existing programs to better serve Indians,168 improving

grant amount for any one tribe in a fiscal year be increased to twenty percent); Joint hearings before
the S. Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources and the Subcomm. on Nuclear Regulation of the S.
Comm. on Environment and Public Works on S. 1662, the National Nuclear Waste Policy Act of
1982, 97th Cong. (Oct. 5–6, 1981) [hereinafter Joint Hearings on S. 1662] (statement of Russell
Jim, The Council on Energy Resource Tribes) (suggesting that Congress amend the bill to improve
effective participation by tribes).
165. See, e.g., Hearing before the H. Comm. on Resources on H.R. 701, the Conservation and
Reinvestment Act, 106th Cong. (June 12, 1999) (statement of Leslie Ramirez, Attorney, on behalf
of Pueblo Santa Ana); Joint hearings before the S. Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources and
the Subcomm. on Nuclear Regulation of the S. Comm. on Environment and Public Works on S.
1662, the National Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 97th Cong. (Oct. 5–6, 1981) (statement of
Russell Jim, The Council on Energy Resource Tribes).
166. See, e.g., Hearing before the Subcomm. on Human Resources of the H. Comm. on Education
and Labor on H.R. 3046, Older Americans Act Amendments of 1981, 97th Cong. (April 29, 1981)
(statement of the National Congress of American Indians) (requesting that Congress amend the bill
to remove certain barriers to participation for Indian elders).
167. Hearing before the H. Comm. on Resources on H.R. 798, the Resources 2000 Act, 106th
Cong. (June 12, 1999) (Leslie Ramirez, Attorney, Pueblo Santa Ana) (requesting that the amount
allocated to tribes be increased).
168. Hearing before the Subcomm. on Human Resources of the H. Comm. on Educ. and Lab. on
H.R. 3046, Older Americans Act Amendments of 1981, 97th Cong. (April 29, 1981) (statement of
the National Congress of American Indians) (requesting amendments to the bill to enable more
Indian communities to receive Title VI benefits, lower the eligibility age requirements to allow the
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the oversight and/or implementation of existing programs,169 altering the
scheme for making grants to Indian nations or organizations,170 and taking
actions to increase tribal participation in a new program.171
2. How Modifiers Advocate: Positions, Tactics, and Arguments
Modifiers behave differently than either proponents or opponents
because they aim to influence the substantive content of the legislative
proposal. In short, for modifiers, it’s all about the text. Like proponents,
they advocate for changes in the law, but the changes they seek focus on
specific provisions in a bill. Modifiers recommend different kinds of changes
to proposed laws depending on how the bill affects them. Thus, they
frequently take positions, use tactics, and make arguments that distinguish
them from both proponents and opponents and aid them in their quest to
improve a legislative text to serve their community more effectively. Each
of the sections below describes some of the positions, tactics, and arguments
employed by Indian advocates acting as modifiers.
a. Positions Taken by Modifiers
Unlike proponents and opponents, who clearly expressed either support
or opposition for a proposed law, Indian advocates often approached a
proposed law in a more nuanced and sophisticated way. Rarely did Indian
modifiers take a position either unconditionally for or against a bill. Rather,
Indian modifiers took a range of positions on proposed laws. Indian
advocates’ positions on a proposed law often depended on how they wanted
members of Congress to alter the law. They varied both in the
recommendations that they made and their commitments to those
recommendations.
Indian modifiers displayed a continuum of positions with most
modifiers falling into one of four distinct categories.172 These positions

majority of Indian elders to qualify for the program, and make the dietary recommendations more
accommodating of traditional diets).
169. Hearing before the S. Comm. on Indian Affs. on S. 400, NAHASDA Amendments of 2000,
106th Cong. (March 17, 1999) (statement of Chester Carl, Chairman, National American Indian
Housing Council) (recommending that Congress amend the bill to improve implementation of the
Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act).
170. Hearing before the H. Comm. on Resources on H.R. 701, the Conservation and
Reinvestment Act, 106th Cong. (June 12, 1999) (statement of Leslie Ramirez, Attorney, on behalf
of Pueblo Santa Ana) (recommending that Title II and III of the legislation be amended to provide
grants to Indian Tribes without any cost match or, in the alternative, to make the maximum cost
share requirement for Indian tribes to be 25 percent).
171. See Joint Hearings on S. 1662, supra note 164.
172. These categories are meant to representative rather than exhaustive.
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include: (1) supporting the bill but preferring some changes, (2) only
supporting the bill if the requested changes are made, (3) preferring an
alternative version of the bill, and (4) wanting something done but expressing
deep concerns about the bill as drafted. Figure 4 displays this continuum of
positions taken by Indian modifiers.173 Often advocate behavior depended
on their position on the bill. Unlike opponents and proponents, modifiers’
positions were relational rather than fixed and could change throughout the
legislative process based on interactions with legislators and other political
actors.174 The following subsections illustrate these varying positions and
discuss each in more depth.
Figure 4: Continuum of Positions of Indian Witnesses Wishing to
Modify a Bill

Support the
bill but
prefer
some
changes

Only
support the
bill if
changes
are made

Prefer an
alternative
version of
the bill

Want
something
done but
not this bill

i. Support the Bill, but Prefer Some Changes
Just under half, 47%, of Indian witnesses using a modification strategy
indicated that they supported the proposed law and also requested changes to
it.175 Often these modifiers advocated for minor changes to the proposed law,
and it was not clear that their support for the bill depended upon the changes
being made. Sometimes the Indian advocate recommended amendments to
the bill but indicated support for it regardless of whether those changes were
made.
The National Indian Health Board’s (“NIHB”) advocacy on the Native
American Alcohol and Substance Abuse Program Consolidation Act of 2000

173. For a continuum of all positions taken by Indian advocates, see supra Part VI.
174. Ziv, supra note 53, at 212–13 (discussing how legislative advocates’ positions are often
relational).
175. Of the 268 Indian modifiers, 125 supported the bill, but preferred changes to it.
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illustrates how an Indian organization supported a proposed law while
arguing that it could be improved to serve Indian country more effectively.
The Native American Alcohol and Substance Abuse Program Consolidation
Act of 2000 sought to enable Indian tribes to consolidate and integrate
alcohol and other substance abuse programs into one program.176 The NIHB,
a nonprofit organization representing tribal governments,177 testified in
support of the bill, but strongly recommended that the Indian Health Service
(“IHS”) rather than the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) serve as the lead
agency in implementing and overseeing programs consolidated under the
law.178 The NIHB argued for the IHS to take the lead because alcoholism is
a disease that affects physical and behavioral health.179 The IHS had already
engaged in numerous programs related to alcohol and substance abuse, and
the NIHB expressed concerns that these initiatives would be derailed if the
BIA became the lead agency.180 The NIHB’s recommendation to make the
IHS the lead agency was uncontroversial. None of the other witnesses
opposed the idea, and both the Department of the Interior and the IHS agreed
that the IHS was the appropriate agency to coordinate these programs.181 The
Senate Committee on Indian Affairs made the requested change during
committee markup,182 and the amended bill was later enacted.
The NIHB’s advocacy on the Native American Alcohol and Substance
Abuse Program Consolidation Act of 2000 shows how even advocates
supportive of a bill see the legislative process as an opportunity to improve
the legislative text to better serve their constituents. The NIHB supported the
bill, but also cared deeply about specific provisions within it and requested
176. Native American Alcohol and Substance Abuse Program Consolidation Act of 2000, S.
1507, 106th Cong. (2000).
177. The NIHB represents both tribal governments who compact or contract with the federal
government to operate their own health care delivery systems and those who receive health care
directly from the Indian Health Service. NATIONAL INDIAN HEALTH BOARD, About NIHB,
https://www.nihb.org/about_us/about_us.php (last visited Feb. 22, 2021).
178. Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs on S. 1507, 106th Cong. 24 (Oct. 13, 1999)
(statement of Yvette Joseph-Fox, Executive Director, National Indian Health Board) (“The National
Indian Health Board supports the intent of S. 1507, as we support the desire of tribal governments
to consolidate many of their programs into a flexible and responsible program at the local level.
However, we strongly recommend that the primary agency responsible for Federal oversight of
these consolidated programs be the Department of Health and Human Services’ Indian Health
Service program.”).
179. Id. at 24–25.
180. Id. at 46. The NIHB also pointed out that tribes found it easier to contract and compact
with the IHS. Id. at 46–47.
181. Alcohol and Substance Abuse Program Consolidation Act: Hearing on S. 1507 Before the
S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 106th Cong. 14 (1999) (statement of Kevin Gover, U.S. Department of
the Interior). Id. at 15 (statement of Michel Lincoln, Indian Health Service).
182. S. REP. NO. 106-306, at 5 (2000) (explaining that the bill was amended to designate the
Indian Health Service the lead agency for coordinating the program).

998

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 80:960

changes to it. They treated the legislative process like an interactive
negotiation over the bill’s substantive content. In this case, their advocacy
appears to have paid off; the Senate Committee changed the bill in response
to their concerns. Not all suggestions to amend a bill are as uncontroversial
and easily made as the ones requested by the NIHB in this case. But many
modifiers who support a bill also simultaneously seek to change it, albeit
sometimes in minor ways. The inclination of Indian advocates to make even
minor suggestions to alter a bill they support indicates how they see the
legislative process as an opportunity to influence the content of proposed
legislation.
ii. Only Support the Bill if Changes are Made
Some Indian modifiers clearly indicated that they would only support a
proposed law if Congress made the changes to the law that they
recommended. Indian advocates often took this position when they
perceived the bill as drafted as problematic and harmful to their interests.
Many preferred to oppose the bill if it could not be changed. Some modifiers
took this position to mitigate the harm to Indian nations and peoples in the
event the law passed. Their tactic seemed to be: if the bill cannot be defeated,
it can at least be altered to harm Indian nations and peoples less. These
mitigation tactics were often employed by tribal governments and
organizations to protect their existing tribal rights.183
The modification strategy used by the Osage Tribal Council on H.R.
4926 serves as an example of advocates only supporting the enactment of a
proposed law if specific changes were made before its enactment.184 H.R.

183. See, e.g., Rail Safety and Service Improvement Act of 1982: Hearing on H.R. 6308 Before
the Subcomm. on Pub. Lands and Nat’l Parks, 97th Cong. 251 (1982) (statement of Alaska
Federation of Natives, Inc.); Internet Gaming Prohibition Act of 1999: Hearing on S. 692 Before
the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 106th Cong. 66–68 (1999) (statement of Richard Williams,
Chairman, Lac Vieux Desert Band of Chippewa Indians).
184. For other examples of Indian advocates taking a similar position, see Hearing on S. 1340
Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 97th Cong. 10–12 (1981) (statement of Ted George,
representing Port Gamble Indian Community, Lower Elwha Tribal Community, and Jamestown
Band of Clallam Indians) (expressing deep dissatisfaction with the bill and requesting amendments
to it); Hearing on S. 1986 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 97th Cong. 12 (1982) (statement
of John Capture, on behalf of the Gros Ventre Tribe of the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation)
(requesting that bill be amended to specify which individuals were to receive per capita payments);
Id. at 14 (statement of Gilbert Horn, on behalf of the Assiniboine Tribe of the Fort Belknap Indian
Reservation) (calling for bill to be amended to exempt payments from taxes). Like the Osage Tribal
Council, these Tribes refused to support the bill until Congress amended it to make the changes they
requested. Once Congress made the changes, their positions shifted to support the bill. S. REP. NO.
97–654, at 2 (1982) (detailing changes to the S. 1349 that responded to concerns raised by the
Clallam tribes); S. REP. NO. 97–492, at 3 (1982) (indicating that amendments to S. 1986 were
adopted after consultation with the tribes).
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4926 authorized the Secretary of the Army to acquire interests in mineral
rights owned by the Osage Indians to complete construction of Lake
Skiatook.185 The Osage Tribal Council initially requested changes to the bill
because it did not clearly state what lands the Tribe had to cede for the
Skiatook Reservoir or the amount of compensation the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers had to pay the Tribe for the land.186 During a hearing before the
House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs in 1981, the Tribe suggested
that the bill be amended to include these details.187 Subsequently, the Tribe
entered into negotiations with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to
determine the lands to be ceded and the amount of compensation.188 After
the Tribe negotiated an agreement with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to
resolve these issues, the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs
amended H.R. 4926, and the Osage Tribal Council passed a resolution
agreeing to support the amended bill.189
The Osage Tribal Council’s advocacy on H.R. 4926 illustrates how
Indian advocates may use a modification strategy to support the enactment
of a proposed law only if specific changes are made before its enactment. It
demonstrates how legislative advocates view the legislative process to be a
lawmaking enterprise. First, the Tribe was focused on improving the
substantive content of the bill and used what power it had to alter the bill’s
content. Unlike opponents who raise fears about what will happen if a bill is
enacted, the Osage Tribal Council engaged in negotiations with the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers to resolve the issues they identified in the bill. 190
Their behavior shows that Indian advocates perceive the legislative process
as a way to negotiate bill content. Second, it demonstrates how Indian
modifiers see the legislative process as relational and negotiable. The Osage
185. A bill to authorize the Secretary of the Army to acquire, by purchase or condemnation, such
interests in oil, gas, coal, and other minerals owned or controlled by the Osage Tribe of Indians as
are needed for Skiatook Lake, Oklahoma, and for other purposes, H.R. Res. 4926, 97th Cong., 95
Stat. 1721 (1981).
186. Hearing on H.R. 4926 Before the H. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 97th Cong. 17
(1981) (statement of Ralph Adkisson, Attorney, Osage Tribal Council); William J. Broad, Despite
Feds, a Tribe Keeps Its Oil Flowing, WASH. POST (June 8, 1980),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1980/06/08/despite-feds-a-tribe-keeps-its-oilflowing/e09c3214-fc69-4d0b-a53d-82a59a98f12c/.
187. See Hearing on H.R. 4926 Before the H. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, supra note
178.
188. Memorandum from Alex Skibine to Congressman Kildee, (Nov. 30, 1981) (on file with the
National Archives, The Center for Legislative Archives, House Committee on Natural Resources
Files on H.R. 4926).
189. H.R. REP. NO. 97–382, at 4–5.
190. Memorandum to Congressman Kildee from Alex Skibine, (Nov. 30, 1981) (on file with the
National Archives, The Center for Legislative Archives, Senate Committee on Indian Affairs files
on H.R. 4926).
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Tribal Council went into the legislative process, opposing the bill and
expecting to negotiate its provisions. In fact, one could argue that they used
their opposition on the bill to encourage the negotiations. Third, the Osage
Tribal Council’s advocacy illustrates how advocates, who are major
stakeholders on a bill, can leverage their position on a bill to affect its
substantive content. In this case, the Osage Tribal Council may have been
able to negotiate the changes it wanted because members of Congress knew
that they could not enact the bill without the support of the Osage Tribal
Council.191 Finally, it illuminates the relational, interactive nature of the
legislative process and how advocates may change their position on a bill as
they respond to and negotiate with other political actors.192 Here, the Osage
Tribal Council shifted its position from opposing the bill and seeking
modifications to it to supporting the bill. The Osage Tribal Council’s
behavior in this case was not usual. As later case studies reiterate, Indian
advocates pursued similar strategies on other bills.
iii. Prefers an Alternative Bill
Some Indian modifiers used a modification strategy because they
preferred an alternative bill and wanted to see Congress enact the bill that
they preferred. Most frequently, this happened when multiple bills on the
same subject matter were introduced in the House and the Senate at the same
time.193 Occasionally, Indian advocates preferred a bill or provisions within
a bill that had been introduced in a previous congressional session and used
a modification strategy to encourage Congress to amend the latest draft bill
to adopt provisions from an earlier bill.
The Tohono O’odham Nation’s (then the Papago Tribe) advocacy on
the Southern Arizona Water Rights Settlement Act of 1982 demonstrates a
strategy used by a tribe when it preferred an alternative bill. Members of
Congress introduced two bills to settle the long-standing water rights claims

191. Indian advocates may also be able to use this kind of leverage when they unify in opposition
against a bill that they perceive harms their interests. For example, Indian advocates strongly
opposed the Internet Gambling Regulatory Act unless it was modified to exempt Indian gaming
under IGRA. See, e.g., Internet Gaming Prohibition Act of 1999: Hearing on S. 692 Before the S.
Comm. on Indian Affairs, 106th Cong. 66–68 (1999). The Senate responded to tribal advocacy by
amending the bill on the floor, but the bill never passed both chambers.
192. Ziv, supra note 53, at 212–13.
193. See, e.g., The Federal Royalty Management Act of 1982: Hearing on S. 2305 Before the S.
Comm. On Energy and Natural Resources, 97th Cong. 400 (1982) (statement of Patricia Brown,
Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation) (testifying that the tribes preferred H.R.
5121 to S. 2305); Water Claims of the Papago Tribe: Hearing on H.R. 5118 and S. 2118 Before the
S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 97th Cong. 70 (1982) (statement of Max H. Norris, Chairman, Papago
Tribe of Arizona (now Tohono O’odham Nation)).
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of the Nation in southern Arizona.194 Drafted after several years of
negotiations between the Nation and local stakeholders, these bills provided
a settlement of the water rights claims of the San Xavier Papago Indian
Reservation and the Schuk Toak District of Sells Papago Indian Reservation
with a minimum of social and economic disruption to the Indian and nonIndian communities in Tucson and eastern Pima County.195 The Tohono
O’odham Nation was guaranteed an annual supply of water from specified
sources in exchange for the settlement of its water rights claims.
The Nation preferred the Senate version of the Southern Arizona Water
Rights Settlement Act of 1982, S. 2114, to the House one, H.R. 5118. S.
2114 included a stipulation that the Bureau of Reclamation and not the
Bureau of Indian Affairs would be the lead agency for the construction of the
water delivery provisions and a provision that the Secretary would pay
damages in the amount of the actual replacement cost of water if the Secretary
could not acquire and deliver the quantities of water promised to the
Nation.196 When it became clear that the House was going to move on H.R.
5118, the Nation advocated to have H.R. 5118 amended to include the more
favorable provisions in S. 2114 and testified that it would oppose the bill
unless the changes to the bill’s language were made.197 The House
Committee on Natural Resources amended the bill in response to the Nation’s
concerns.198
The legislative advocacy by the Tohono O’odham Nation is an example
of a tribe preferring an alternative bill when the House and Senate have
introduced similar bills on the same topic. Like the advocacy of the NIHB
and the Osage Tribal Council, it shows how Indian advocates view the
legislative process as a negotiation over the legislative text. Here, the Nation
194. Southern Arizona Water Rights Settlement Act of 1982, S. 2114, 97th Cong. (1982);
Southern Arizona Water Rights Settlement Act of 1982, H.R. 5118, 97th Cong. (1982).
195. Letter to President Reagan from Morris K. Udall, (June 4, 1982) (on file with the National
Archives, The Center for Legislative Archives, House Committee on Natural Resources, files on
H.R. 5118).
196. See Water Claims of the Papago Tribe: Hearing on H.R. 5118 and S. 2118 Before the S.
Comm. on Indian Affairs, supra note 185; Letter from Barry Goldwater to William Cohen, (Mar.
31, 1982) (on file with the National Archives, The Center for Legislative Archives, Senate
Committee on Indian Affairs, files on H.R. 5118).
197. See Water Claims of the Papago Tribe: Hearing on H.R. 5118 and S. 2118 Before the S.
Comm. on Indian Affairs, supra note 185.
198. H.R. REP. NO. 97-422, at 12 (1982) (“The bill as reported by this Committee is endorsed
and supported by the major water users in eastern Pima Count[y], including the major mining
interests and farm operations, the City of Tucson and officials of the Papago Tribe.”). President
Reagan vetoed the bill because the federal government had not participated in the water settlement
negotiations. President Reagan’s Veto Message to Congress on H.R. 5118, National Archives, The
Center for Legislative Archives, House Committee on Natural Resources, files on H.R. 5118. The
bill was later added as a separate title and enacted as part of a related bill. Pub. L. 97-293 (1982).
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used its hearing testimony to encourage Congress to enact the provisions of
the bill they preferred and threatened to oppose the bill if those changes were
not made. It also illustrates how advocates can leverage their influence over
the text of a proposed law through the position that they take on it. The
Nation, like the Osage Tribal Council, used their criticisms of the bill to
encourage members of Congress to support a bill that better suited them.
Like the Osage Tribal Council, the Nation may have had more power in this
case because it was a tribe -specific bill and members of Congress may have
had reservations about enacting a bill that directly affected one tribe without
its support.199
iv. Raising New Issues
Some Indian advocates appeared to engage in modification strategies
because they wanted to raise issues related to, but not addressed in, the
legislation.200 These modifiers used the legislative process as an opportunity
to suggest that the proposed legislation had missed the real issues affecting
Indian country and that members of Congress should consider approaching
the issue in a vastly different way or address a related issue that Indian
advocates perceived to be more important.
The Oglala Sioux Tribe’s advocacy on the Indian Tribal Economic
Development and Contract Encouragement Act of 2000 serves as an example
of Indian modifiers raising issues related to, but not addressed in, the
proposed legislation.201 The Indian Tribal Economic Development and
Contract Encouragement Act of 2000 proposed amendments to 25 U.S.C.

199. The Nation may have had more leverage on this particular bill because it was a key
stakeholder in the water rights settlement. The water rights settlement basically could not move
forward without the Nation’s consent.
200. See, e.g., Gaming Regulatory Improvement Act of 1999: Hearing on S. 399 Before the S.
Comm. on Indian Affairs, 106th Cong. 47 (1999) (statement of W. Ron Allen, President, National
Congress of American Indians) (arguing that this bill was not necessary and that Congress really
needed to enact a Seminole Fix); Indian Tribal Justice Technical and Legal Assistance Act of 2000:
Hearing on S. 5108 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 106th Cong. 23–24 (1999) (Navajo
Nation arguing that Congress needed to fund tribal justice systems); To Amend the Indian
Judgement Funds Act of 1973: Hearing on H.R. 3731 Before the H. Comm. On Interior and Insular
Affairs, 97th Cong. 10–16 (1981) (statement of Robert T. Coulter); Indian Land Consolidation Act
Amendments: Joint Hearing on S. 1586, S. 1315 and H.R. 3181 Before the S. Comm. on Indian
Affairs and the H. Comm. on Resources, 106th Cong. 56–57 (1999) (statement of Delmar “Poncho”
Bigby, Indian Land Working Group) (testifying that the bill completely ignores the needs of
individuals and does not provide any options for individuals to consolidate land).
201. Business Development on Indian Lands: Hearing on S. 613 and S. 614 Before the S. Comm.
on Indian Affairs, 106th Cong. 77 (1999) (statement of Harold D. Salway, President, Oglala Sioux
Tribe). The Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation also testified on the bill. They
sought specific changes to the text of the bill. Id. at 23–24.
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§ 81, which governs contracts with Indian tribes.202 Enacted in 1872, the
original section 81 established technical drafting requirements for and
mandated that the Secretary of the Interior approve most contracts between
tribal governments and non-Indians.203 The Indian Tribal Economic
Development and Contract Encouragement Act of 2000 proposed changes to
the scope and operation of section 81. It sought to clarify which contracts
required secretarial approval, specify the criteria for the approval of those
contracts, and provide that contracts covered by the Act had to disclose or
waive tribal sovereign immunity.204 The Tribe employed its testimony on
this bill as a way to argue for the repeal of 25 U.S.C. § 81.205 It argued against
the provisions of the bill requiring tribal governments and businesses to
disclose or waive tribal sovereign immunity in certain contracts approved by
the Secretary of the Interior by asserting that the Secretary should not be
approving any contracts with Indian tribes.206 The Tribe contended that
secretarial approval of contracts with Indian tribal governments and
businesses had outlived its usefulness and was unnecessary because tribes are
capable of managing and administering their own affairs.207 Most likely, the
Tribe knew that repeal of Section 81 was unlikely, but it utilized the
opportunity to start educating members of Congress about the competency of
tribal governments and businesses, the problems with Section 81, and their
desire to have the section repealed.
The Oglala Sioux Tribe’s advocacy shows how Indian advocates use
modification strategies to educate members of Congress about important
issues overlooked in a proposed bill. Like the Osage Tribal Council and
NIHB, the Oglala Sioux Tribe saw the legislative process as interactive and
used it to engage with members of Congress about existing laws. The Tribe’s
strategy also provides insights into how and why legislative advocates using
modification strategies act differently from both proponents and opponents.
The Tribe argued for a different approach than the one taken in the bill, but
unlike opponents, it was not trying to protect the status quo. Rather, the Tribe
wanted to reform the status quo through the repeal of an existing law. In this
respect, their efforts resemble incremental law reform strategies used by

202. S. 613, 106th Cong. (2000).
203. Ann-Emily C. Gaupp, The Indian Tribal Economic Development and Contracts
Encouragement Act: Smoke Signals of a New Era in Federal Indian Policy, 33 CONN. L. REV. 667,
669–70 (2001).
204. Id.
205. Business Development on Indian Lands: Hearing on S. 613 and S. 614 Before the S. Comm.
on Indian Affairs, 106th Cong. 77 (1999) (statement of Harold D. Salway, President, Oglala Sioux
Tribe) (recommending repeal of section 81).
206. Id.
207. Id.
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proponents.208 Similar to proponents, the Tribe engaged in a long-term
strategy by trying to educate members of Congress about an issue and set the
stage for later reforms.
***
The broad range of positions that legislative advocates take in
advocating for modifications to proposed laws illuminate key aspects of
advocate behavior overlooked in the present literature. First, it suggests
tremendous variation in how advocates seek to change proposed laws prior
to their enactment. Second, across this variation, commonalities in
advocate’s behaviors and perceptions about the legislative process emerge.
Importantly, the case studies reveal how legislative advocates, regardless of
their position on the bill, perceive the legislative process as a lawmaking
enterprise. Advocates are engaged because they shape the content of the
laws, either in terms of the bill being discussed or over the long term.
Relatedly, they view the process as interactive and dynamic. Advocates
voice their views and expect that legislators, their staffs, and other political
actors will react to their arguments and that collectively, they will craft
statutory laws. As a result, legislative advocates have both a role and power
within the legislative process. Frequently, they can negotiate with other
actors and use whatever power they may have to influence legislative texts.
b. Tactics Used by Modifiers
The tactics used by Indian advocates often reflected their motivations
for using a modification strategy and the kind of bill on which they chose to
advocate. Indian advocates used two different tactics depending on the kind
of Indian-related bill on which they advocated. Each of these tactics further
shows how legislative advocates perceive the legislative process as a
lawmaking enterprise and an opportunity to shape the substantive content of
the law.
One tactic of Indian modifiers was to engage in targeted advocacy on a
bill. This tactic appeared most frequently when Indian advocates sought
changes to general bills that included provisions affecting Indians. Indian
advocates often targeted their advocacy on a particular program or provisions
within the general bill. For example, the National Congress of American
Indians (“NCAI”), the oldest, largest, and most representative American
Indian and Alaska Native organization, requested very specific amendments

208. For a detailed discussion of proponents employing an incremental law reform strategy, see
Carlson, Lobbying as a Strategy for Tribal Resilience, supra note 19, at 1191–92, 1194–95
(recounting the strategy used by tribal advocates to obtain limited jurisdiction over non-Indian
perpetrators of intimate violence in the Violence Against Women Act of 2013).
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to the Older Americans Act Amendments of 1981.209 The Older Americans
Act Amendments of 1981 sought to extend the Older Americans Act of 1965
for an additional three years and clarify the functions of the Commissioner
on Aging and other aspects of federal programs and assistance for older
Americans.210 NCAI focused its advocacy on Title VI, which provides grants
to tribal organizations to assist older Indians. It wanted certain barriers to
participation for Indian elders removed, including: (1) a community to have
at least seventy-five elders before it could receive Title VI benefits, (2) the
eligibility age requirements, which were too high to allow the majority of
Indian elders to qualify for the program, and (3) the dietary recommendations
because they differed so drastically from traditional diets that they created
emotional and health conflicts for Indian elders.211 The Committee
responded to some of the NCAI’s requests by amending Title VI to change
the definition of Indians to be served from “Indians aged 60 and over” to
“older Indians” and striking the requirement that a state’s Title III allocation
be reduced by an amount attributable to the number of Indians to be served.212
The NCAI asked for these changes because the circumstances of Indian
elders differ from those of the general population and it wanted to educate
Congress about these differences.213 The Committee Report on the bill also
suggested that the Commissioner on Aging take note of the historical
differences in dietary practices between Indian and non-Indian populations
to allow for some flexibility for the dietary preferences of the Indian
population.214 These amendments appear to respond directly to the concerns
raised by the NCAI, but it is not clear whether Congress’ enactment of a very
similar bill with identical changes to Title VI satisfied all the concerns raised
by NCAI.215 As this case shows, even when Congress does not adopt all the
amendments proposed by Indian nations and organizations, they may
influence the bill by shaping its content. Without NCAI’s input, Congress

209. Hearing on H.R. 3046 Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources of the H. Comm. on
Educ. and Labor, 97th Cong. 107 (1981) (statement of Ronald Andrade, National Congress of
American Indians).
210. H.R. 3046, 97th Cong. (1982).
211. See Hearing on H.R. 3046 Before the Subcomm. on Human Res. of the H. Comm. on Educ.
and Labor, supra note 209.
212. H.R. REP. NO. 97–70, at 3 (1981).
213. NCAI asked for a lower age requirement because “[t]he median Indian lifespan is
approximately six years less than the rest of the Nation’s population.” Hearing on H.R. 3046 Before
the Subcomm. on Human Resources of the H. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, supra note 209 at 107.
Similarly, the NCAI cited the isolated, rural locations of most Indian reservations as contributing to
the inability of tribes to meet the numerical requirements for hosting a program. Id.
214. H.R. REP. NO. 97–70, supra note 212, at 3.
215. Older Americans Act Amendments of 1981, S. 1086, 97th Cong. (1981).
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probably would not have amended the Older Americans Act Amendments of
1981, and the provisions problematic for Indian elders would have remained.
The NCAI’s advocacy on the Older Americans Act Amendments of
1981 demonstrates how advocates may use targeted advocacy to shape
provisions in general bills. It illustrates how advocates viewed specific
provisions of the bill as important to them and engaged in advocacy even
though they were not major stakeholders on the bill. Indian advocates saw
the bill as an opportunity to use targeted advocacy to focus on the provisions
of the bill that affected their communities. They sought to improve the
content of a general policy that affected a significant portion of the American
Indian population and added their voices to the mix of advocacy on the bill.
Indian modifiers used advocacy to educate members of Congress about issues
specific to them and to shape the provisions in the bill with the most impact
on them.
Indian advocates used a different tactic when they advocated on pantribal bills.216 Pan-tribal bills differ from general bills because Indian nations
and their citizens are the major stakeholders on pan-tribal bills, which are
designed to shape federal Indian policy for all tribes. In advocating on pantribal bills, Indian modifiers employed a modification strategy to negotiate
with the federal government, other Indian advocates, and sometimes, the
states, over the direction of federal Indian policy. Indian advocates did not
necessarily target certain provisions of the bill like they did when seeking to
modify a general bill, but often suggested changes throughout the bill and/or
tried to refocus the bill to shift federal Indian law and policy in a direction
favorable to them. Their negotiations with members of Congress were also
more dialectic on pan-tribal bills than general bills. Sometimes members of
Congress solicited input from Indian advocates and invited them to suggest
changes to pan-tribal bills.217 Committees also tended to consult with Indian
nations and advocates throughout the legislative process on pan-tribal bills.

216. See, e.g., Indian Needs Assessment and Program Evaluation Act of 1999, S. 612, 106th
Cong. (1999); The Indian Federal Recognition Administrative Procedures Act of 1999: Hearing on
S. 611 before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 106th Cong. (2000); A bill to amend the American
Indian Trust Fund Management Reform Act of 1994: Hearing on S. 1587 and S. 1589 Before the S.
Comm. on Indian Affairs, 106th Cong. (1999); The Indian Tribal Development Consolidated
Funding Act of 2000: Hearing on S. 2052 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 106th Cong.
(2000); Indian Health Care Improvement Act Reauthorization of 2000, S. 2526, 106th Cong. (2000).
217. See, e.g., A bill to amend the American Indian Trust Fund Management Reform Act of 1994:
Hearing on S. 1587 and S. 1589 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 106th Cong. (1999); The
Indian Tribal Development Consolidated Funding Act of 2000: Hearing on S. 2052 Before the S.
Comm. on Indian Affairs, 106th Cong. (2000).
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The National American Indian Housing Council’s (“NAIHC”)
advocacy218 on the Native American Housing Assistance and SelfDetermination Act (“NAHASDA”) Amendments of 2000 illustrates how
Indian advocates use modification strategies to negotiate federal Indian
policy with the federal government.219 The NAHASDA Amendments of
2000 proposed to improve delivery of housing assistance to Indian tribes in
a manner that recognized tribal self-governance.220 Senators Inouye and
Campbell introduced the bill after receiving complaints from tribes about the
implementation of the 1996 Native American Housing Assistance and SelfDetermination Act.221 The NAIHC perceived the legislative process as a way
to negotiate improvements in federal Indian housing policy and the
implementation of NAHASDA. It saw its testimony as “a beginning for
discussions on NAHASDA.”222
The NAIHC made multiple
recommendations for improving the implementation of NAHASDA in its
reauthorization, including, inter alia, defining the terms used in the bill,
restricting the authority given to the Secretary to conduct audits, authorizing
adequate funding for the block grant program, limiting the time frame for
performance agreements, and revising the environmental review provisions
to allow tribes to make mistakes and not lose their funding.223 The NAIHC
sought both to focus the bill on improving the implementation of
NAHASDA, which many tribal governments had found lacking, and to make
detailed suggestions about specific provisions of the proposed bill. After the
hearing, the Committee submitted a long list of specific questions to NAIHC
about different proposed provisions in the bill. The Committee’s request for
more information from NAIHC indicated its willingness to consult NAIHC
on and negotiate with tribal governments over the content of the bill. The
Committee amended the bill before reporting it out and included several
amendments responsive to NAIHC’s concerns.224 The Senate passed the
amended bill, but it did not move forward in the House. Many of the
218. The National American Indian Housing Council “represents the unique and historic
interests of tribes and tribally designed housing entities on American Indian and Alaskan Native
housing issues.” NATIONAL AMERICAN INDIAN HOUSING COUNCIL, NAIHC’s Advocacy Mission,
http://naihc.net/advocacy/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2021).
219. S. 400, 106th Cong. (2000).
220. Id.
221. The Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act Amendments of 2000:
Hearing on S. 400 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 106th Cong. (1999).
222. Id. at 21 (statement of Carl Chester, National American Indian Housing Council).
223. Id. at 26–28.
224. For example, the Committee appears to have responded to the NAIHC’s comments by
amending the bill to allow the Secretary to waive the requirements of the environmental review
process in certain limited circumstances, change the auditing authority of the Secretary, and
authorize more funding for certain tribes. S. REP. NO. 106–145 at 4–7 (1999).
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NAIHC’s recommendations, however, were later adopted and enacted in the
American Homeownership and Economic Opportunity Act of 2000.225
NAIHC’s approach to the hearing on the NAHASDA Amendments of
2000 demonstrates how advocacy groups see the legislative process as an
interactive and dynamic negotiation over federal Indian policy. It reveals
how Indian advocates used the multiple stages of the legislative process to
create a dialogue with members of Congress over NAHASDA and its
implementation, which ultimately led Congress to amend the Act to serve
Indian communities better. Tribal governments raised concerns about the
lack of implementation of NAHASHA, which encouraged Senator Inouye
and Senator Campbell to draft the NAHASDA Amendments of 2000.226
NAIHC continued the dialogue with members of Congress about the bill
during the next stage of the legislative process. NAIHC testified on the bill,
knowing that it may not move forward but seeing it as an opportunity to
educate members of Congress, shape the bill’s text, and influence federal
Indian policy more broadly by reiterating the importance of Indian selfdetermination in housing. The Committee listened to the NAIHC’s concerns.
It then further engaged with the NAIHC on the bill’s provisions by asking
NAIHC for its input through a series of questions, and finally amended the
bill in response to this series of interactions.227 Like other legislative
advocates,228 Indian advocates strategically used the stages of the legislative
process to engage members of Congress and to negotiate substantive
amendments to federal Indian housing policy through a series of interactive
exchanges with legislators.
c. Arguments Made by Modifiers
Modifiers’ separate agenda—to shape the proposed law in a way that
better responds to their interests—informs the arguments they make and
demonstrates the role that law plays in legislative advocacy. As the examples
in the previous sections show, modifiers focus on shaping a legislative text
in ways that respond to their concerns. Modifiers make different kinds of
arguments in their efforts to do this. Consistent with the behavior of
225. Pub. L. No. 106-569, § 503, 114 Stat. 2961–62 (amending NAHASDA to, inter alia, permit
the Secretary to waive certain environmental review requirements under specified conditions and to
revise the audit, review, and hearing provisions). Congress also enacted some amendments to
NAHASDA in the Omnibus Indian Advancement Act. Pub. L. No. 106–568, § 1003, 114 Stat.
2925–27.
226. The Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act Amendments of 2000:
Hearing on S. 400 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 106th Cong. 1 (1999) (statement of
Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell).
227. Id.
228. King, et al., supra note 52, at 1214.

2021]

RETHINKING LEGISLATIVE ADVOCACY

1009

legislative advocates more generally,229 Indian modifiers drew on policy
arguments in advocating for changes in the proposed law. Indian modifiers,
however, did not use policy arguments in the same ways as proponents and
opponents.
Significantly, modifiers did not rely solely on political arguments.
Legal arguments also emerged as integral to Indian advocates’ efforts to
shape proposed laws. Consistent with their focus on changing provisions in
the legislative text, Indian advocates frequently used legal frames and
arguments in their advocacy.
i. Policy arguments
Political science studies have well documented the kinds of policy
arguments made by proponents and opponents.230 Indian modifiers made
arguments similar to proponents and opponents, but not in the same ways that
opponents or proponents do.
Indian modifiers borrowed arguments from both proponents and
opponents.
Their use of these arguments complicates existing
understandings of how advocates argue about the status quo. Recall that
existing studies show that proponents argue for the status quo and opponents
argue against the status quo.231 The kinds of arguments that legislative
advocates make then flow from their position on the status quo. For example,
proponents make arguments about how the bill benefits society, is not
prohibitively expensive or is worth the cost, and will meet its objectives.232
Modifiers’ use of policy arguments did not easily fit within this existing
model of for and against the status quo. Often Indian modifiers highlighted
the drawbacks of a proposed law not because they wanted the bill defeated
but because they wanted Congress to amend the bill to improve it.233
Consider the Osage Tribal Council’s advocacy on H.R. 4926, discussed

229. See supra Part II.
230. See supra Part II.
231. See supra Part II.
232. See supra Part II.
233. For an example of this, see the discussion of the advocacy of the Three Affiliated Tribes of
the Fort Berthold Reservation, the Shoshone and Arapahoe Indian Tribes of the Wind River
Reservation in Wyoming, and the Council of Energy Resource Tribes on the Federal Energy and
Mineral Resources Act of 1982. See infra Part III.c.ii. In that case, the Indian advocates supported
the bill, but they used arguments highlighting its drawbacks to encourage members of Congress to
amend it. See also Indian Land Consolidation Act Amendments: Joint Hearing on S. 1586, S. 1315,
and H.R. 3181 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affs. and the H. Comm. on Res., 106th Cong. 56–57
(1999) (statement of Delmar “Poncho” Bigby, Indian Land Working Group) (testifying that the bill
needed to be amended because it completely ignored the needs of individuals and did not provide
any options for individuals to consolidate land).
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previously, as an example of this.234 The Osage Tribal Council opposed the
bill and made arguments about its unfairness to encourage legislators to
support amendments to it. The Osage case demonstrates how Indian
modifiers were not for the status quo like opponents but were using
arguments similar to opponents to negotiate for changes to the bill. Like
proponents, Indian modifiers wanted changes in the law, but they did not like
the ones in the proposed bill. Rather than accept the proposed changes to the
law in the bill, Indian modifiers suggested amendments to the bill that
Congress could enact to improve both the bill and existing law. In short,
these Indian modifiers wanted the status quo changed, just not in the way the
bill proposed.
Other Indian modifiers wanted to have a say about the status quo that
was about to be created by the bill. For example, Indian tribes and the
Council on Energy Resource Tribes testified on the Nuclear Waste Policy
Act of 1982235 because they wanted to ensure that tribal governments were
treated like states in any comprehensive program that Congress developed to
deal with nuclear waste storage.236 These Indian advocates were advocating
to have a say in the status quo to be established in the bill because it was the
first time Congress had created a comprehensive program for dealing with
nuclear waste storage.
These examples indicate that while Indian modifiers frequently made
policy arguments in their advocacy, they did not use these arguments in the
same way as proponents or opponents. Nor did Indian modifiers fit neatly
into categorizations of legislative advocates as either for or against the status
quo. Rather, Indian modifiers were using policy arguments in more nuanced
and strategic ways.
ii. Legal Arguments
Indian advocates did not rely solely on policy arguments. The law often
played a key role in Indian advocates’ arguments. Indian modifiers,
proponents, and opponents all used legal frames and arguments in their
advocacy.237 Indian advocates frequently invoked key tenets of existing
234. See supra Part V.
235. H.R. 3809, 97th Cong. (1982).
236. Radioactive Waste Legislation: Hearing on H.R. 1993, H.R. 2800, H.R. 2840, H.R. 2881,
and H.R. 3809 Before the Subcomm. on Energy and the Env’t of the H. Comm. on Interior and
Insular Affs., 97th Cong. (1981) (statement of the Council of Energy Resources Tribes, the Yakima
Indian Nation, and the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes of Ft. Hall, ID).
237. Indian nations and organizations opposing the Steelhead Trout Protection Act heavily relied
on legal frames and arguments to persuade members of Congress to protect their tribal sovereignty
and treaty fishing rights. See infra Part V. My previous research details how Indian proponents
have used legal arguments and frames to protect their tribal sovereignty, build their institutions, and
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federal Indian law, including tribal sovereignty,238 self-determination,239 the
trust relationship,240 and treaties.241 They also made very specific legal
arguments about how a particular proposed law would undermine existing
federal laws.242
Indian advocates used the law in varying ways across subject matters
and kinds of Indian-related bills. Indian advocates often employed the law
to argue for improvements to general bills that would harm their interests.243
They seemed to be utilizing the law to educate members of Congress about
the government-to-government relationship between the federal government

maintain control over their lands and natural resources. Carlson, Making Strategic Choices, supra
note 16, at 939; Carlson, Lobbying as a Strategy for Tribal Resilience, supra note 19, at 1177–20.
238. See, e.g., Steelhead Trout Protection Act Part I: Hearing on S. 874 Before the S. Comm. on
Indian Affairs, 97th Cong. (1981).
239. See, e.g., Trust Fund Management Reform Act: Hearing on S. 1587 and S. 1589 Before the
S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 106th Cong. 43 (1999) (statement of Reid Chambers) (raising concerns
about the Office of Trust Fund Management not honoring self-determination); Id. at 42 (statement
of Anna Whiting Sorrell) (requesting that Committee consider the impact of the proposed legislation
on self-determination, which is an effective Indian policy); Business Development on Indian Lands:
Hearing on S. 613 and S. 614 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 106th Cong. 77 (1999)
(statement of Harold D. Salway, President, Oglala Sioux Tribe) (referring to tribal selfdetermination by emphasizing the capacity of tribes to manage their own affairs).
240. See, e.g., Trust Fund Management Reform Act: Hearing on S. 1587 and S. 1589 Before the
S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 106th Cong. 50–51 (1999) (statement of Reid Chambers, Assiniboine
and Sioux Tribes of the Ft. Peck Reservation) (discussing the importance of the trust responsibility
and its relationship to treaties); Federal Energy and Mineral Resources Act of 1982: Hearing on S.
2305 Before the S. Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 97th Cong. 400 (1982) (statement of
Patricia Brown, Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation); Id. at 128 (statement of
Saul Goodman, Shoshone and Arapahoe Indian Tribes, Wind River Reservation, WY).
241. See, e.g., Trust Fund Management Reform Act: Hearing on S. 1587 and S. 1589 Before the
S. Comm. on Indian Affs., 106th Cong. 50–51 (1999) (statement of Reid Chambers, Assiniboine and
Sioux Tribes of the Ft. Peck Reservation); Federal Energy and Mineral Resources Act of 1982:
Hearing on S. 2305 Before the S. Comm. on Energy and Nat. Res., 97th Cong. 400 (1982) (statement
of Patricia Brown, Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation); id. at 128 (statement
of Saul Goodman, Shoshone and Arapahoe Indian Tribes, Wind River Reservation, WY).
242. See, e.g., Trust Fund Management Reform Act: Hearing on S. 1587 and S. 1589 Before the
S. Comm. on Indian Affs., 106th Cong. 40–41 (1999) (statement of Anna Whiting Sorrell,
Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation) (arguing that current
implementation of the Trust Reform Act of 1994 conflicts with the Indian Self-determination Act
of 1995 and forestalls implementation of tribal self-determination); Internet Gaming: Hearing on
S. 692 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affs., 106th Cong. 66–68 (1999) (statement of Richard
Williams, Chairman, Lac Vieux Desert Band of Chippewa Indians) (arguing that the bill amends
IGRA in a harmful manner that would disrupt the delicate balance between tribes and states and
recommending that Class II gaming be exempted from the prohibition on internet gaming).
243. See, e.g., Trust Fund Management Reform Act: Hearing on S. 1587 and S. 1589 Before the
S. Comm. on Indian Affs., 106th Cong. 40–41 (1999) (statement of Anna Whiting Sorrell,
Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation); Internet Gaming: Hearing
on S. 692 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affs., 106th Cong. 68–70 (1999) (statement of Richard
Williams, Chairman, Lac Vieux Desert Band of Chippewa Indians).
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and Indian nations, as well as raising concerns about how specific proposed
laws could impact existing federal laws.
The advocacy of the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold
Reservation, the Shoshone and Arapahoe Indian Tribes of the Wind River
Reservation in Wyoming and the Council of Energy Resource Tribes on the
Federal Energy and Mineral Resources Act of 1982 illustrates how Indian
advocates employed the law to persuade legislators to improve a proposed
bill. The Federal Energy and Mineral Resources Act of 1982 sought to
improve laws related to the obligations of lessees of federal and Indian oil
and gas leases, to clarify the authority of the Secretary of the Interior to
maintain a proper system of royalty management, accounting and collection,
and to encourage enforcement practices necessary to ensure proper collection
of revenues.244 The Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation,
the Shoshone and Arapahoe Indian Tribes of the Wind River Reservation in
Wyoming, and the Council of Energy Resource Tribes wanted Congress to
eliminate Section 20 of the Federal Energy and Mineral Resources Act of
1982, which required tribes to pay up to one percent of their royalties into a
fund for royalty accounting services.245 Indian advocates employed legal
frames and arguments to persuade members of Congress to amend the bill.
They argued that Section 20 violated a fundamental tenet of federal Indian
law—the trust responsibility that exists among the tribes and the federal
244. The Federal Royalty Management Act of 1982, S. 2305, 97th Cong. (1982). The bill
responded to concerns about the archaic nature of the royalty accounting system and thefts of oil
and gas from federal and Indian lease sites that lacked adequate security measures. The Department
of the Interior had appointed a Commission on Fiscal Accountability of the Nation’s Energy
Resources (commonly known as the Linowes Commission, after its Chairman, David F. Linowes),
which conducted a thorough investigation. The draft bill included many of the recommendations
made by the Linowes Commission. Federal Energy and Mineral Resources Act of 1982: Hearing
on S. 2305 Before the S. Comm. on Energy and Nat. Res., 297th Cong. (1982).
245. Federal Energy and Mineral Resources Act of 1982: Hearing on S. 2305 Before the S.
Comm. on Energy and Nat. Res., 97th Cong. 400 (1982) (statement of Patricia Brown, Three
Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation); Id. at 128 (statement of Saul Goodman,
Shoshone and Arapahoe Indian Tribes, Wind River Reservation, WY); Id. at 138 (statement of Ed
Gabriel, Council of Energy Resource Tribes). Other tribes supported these efforts as well.
Mailgram from Norman Hollow, Chairman of the Ft. Peck Tribal Executive Board to Senator John
Melcher (May 11, 1982) (on file with the National Archives, The Center for Legislative Archives,
Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, files on S. 2305); Letter from Marvin Sonosky to Senator
James McClure (May 24, 1982) (on file with the National Archives, The Center for Legislative
Archives, Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, files on S. 2305); Comments of the Blackfeet Tribe
on S. 2305 (on file with the National Archives, The Center for Legislative Archives, Senate
Committee on Indian Affairs, files on S. 2305); Mailgram from Allen Rowland, Chairman, Northern
Cheyenne Tribal Council to Senator Melcher (May 10, 1982) (on file with the National Archives,
The Center for Legislative Archives, Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, files on S. 2305);
Mailgram from John Windy Boy, Chairman, Chippewa-Cree Business Committee to Senator
Melcher (May 10, 1982) (on file with the National Archives, The Center for Legislative Archives,
Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, files on S. 2305).
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government.246
They emphasized how problems with the royalty
management system, which allowed oil companies not to pay royalties to the
tribes for many years, breached the federal government’s duty to act as a
trustee and protect Indian interests in their oil and gas.247 They argued that it
was contrary to the government’s trust responsibility and unfair for the
government to now make the tribes pay for the administration of a program
that had mismanaged leases on tribal trust land to their substantial financial
detriment.248 Congress responded to tribal concerns by deleting Section 20
before incorporating the amended version of S. 2305 into H.R. 5121, the

246. Federal Energy and Mineral Resources Act of 1982: Hearing on S. 2305 Before the S.
Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 97th Cong. 130 (1982) (statement of Saul Goodman,
Shoshone and Arapahoe Indian Tribes, Wind River Reservation, WY) (“[I]t would be a breach of
fiduciary duty to use tribal funds to pay for the royalty accounting on nontribal leases, and in this
regard they are somewhat concerned by the manner in which section 20 is now drafted”); Id. at 403
(statement of Patricia Brown, Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation) (“[Section
20] should be deleted. Its effect is to exact a charge from Indians for the fulfillment of the United
States’ basic governmental and trust responsibilities. The treaties and statutes under which trust
responsibilities were established do not contemplate such a charge. Surely, no segment of the
population, never mind one of the neediest, should be directly charged for basic governmental
services . . . .”).
247. Id. at 140 (statement of Ed Gabriel, Council of Energy Resource Tribes) (“The DOI, as
trustee to the tribes has the responsibility to effectively protect the tribes’ interests in Indian-owned
resources held in trust. In regard to minerals management, it is clear that the Department, not the
tribes, has failed over the years in carrying out that responsibility. It is also clear that the companies
operating on Indian lands have too often failed to carry out their responsibilities as lessees, yet now
we see the financial burden of correcting the Department’s problems being placed on the tribes
through Section 20.”). They also informed Congress of the extent of the theft and underreporting
of royalties that had already occurred. Id. at 128–29 (statements of Saul Goodman, Shoshone and
Arapahoe Indian Tribes, Wind River Reservation, WY) (noting that the tribes had to recover over
$1 million in previously unpaid royalties after they investigated allegations of theft and
underreporting of royalties on their reservation).
248. Id. at 129 (statement of Saul Goodman, Shoshone and Arapahoe Indian Tribes, Wind River
Reservation, WY) (“Section 20 would require the Indian tribe to contribute up to 1 percent of their
royalties to a fund to be used for royalty accounting purposes. In effect, the tribe would be required
to pay the fund for the royalty management services of the Department of the Interior, at least to
contribute a pro rata share. It is the view of the tribes that in light of what they have discovered
during this investigation and what the Linowes Commission has concluded, that is, that these leases
have been seriously mismanaged for years, the tribes do feel it is simply unfair to be asked to pay
for these services. The services have been inadequate. The tribes have been required to put out a
lot of money to bring the lease accounts into order now. The tribes have no assurance that they can
stop investing, that they ought to stop investing their money now, but rather they must keep a careful
eye to insure that things will be taken care of properly in the future, and in addition, although they
have recovered substantial royalties, there are certain problems that occurred in the past that they
may never be able to fully recover their losses for. Under these circumstances, the tribes simply
feel that it would be unfair to be asked to pay the burden for these services that in the past have been
so woefully inadequate.”); id. at 139–40 (statement of Ed Gabriel, Council of Energy Resource
Tribes) (noting that Section 20 would place a substantial burden on Indian tribes and questioning
the equity of that burden).
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Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management Act of 1982.249 Congress
subsequently enacted the amended version of H.R. 5121.250
Indian advocacy on the Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management Act
of 1982 is instructive because it shows how Indian advocates employed legal
frames and arguments in negotiating with legislators over the text. It
reiterates that legislative advocacy is about the creation of legal texts and
demonstrates how Indian advocates engaged with legislators to craft the law.
Moreover, the response of legislators to legal frames and arguments used by
Indian advocates indicates that these arguments may have some influence on
legislators and that the law may matter more to legislators than previous
studies have suggested.251
V. IMPLICATIONS OF A LEGAL APPROACH FOR STUDYING LEGISLATIVE
ADVOCACY
The implications of this research for advocacy studies, interest group
studies, and legal scholars are significant. In a world in which advocates
increasingly influence legislation and frequently draft laws, legal scholars,
political scientists, and advocacy scholars need to develop more nuanced
approaches to understanding the role advocates play and how they use the
law in legislative lawmaking.252 My research contributes to this larger project
by expanding existing understandings of advocate behavior and emphasizing
how advocates employ the law in legislative lawmaking.
This Article presents an innovative new approach to studying legislative
advocacy from a legal perspective. It improves upon existing political
science approaches for understanding how advocates behave by emphasizing
how legislative advocacy occurs within and responds to an interactive and
dynamic legislative process. It views the legislative process as a lawmaking
enterprise and highlights the importance of the substantive content of its final
product, statutory law, to legislative advocates and their behavior.
My legal approach to studying legislative advocacy combines
theoretical and methodological insights from political science and legal
literatures. It starts from the premise that advocates are strategic actors
249. H.R. 5121, 97th Cong. (1982); see also S. Rep. No. 97-512 (1982) (indicating that the
Committee deleted the provision requiring tribal payment for royalty management services prior to
reporting out the bill). The Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation actually
preferred H.R. 5121 to S. 2305. Federal Energy and Mineral Resources Act of 1982: Hearing on S.
2305 Before the S. Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 97th Cong. 400 (1982) (statement of
Patricia Brown, Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation).
250. Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-451, 96 Stat. 2447.
251. BAUMGARTNER, ET AL., supra note 6, at 145; BURSTEIN, supra note 39, at 145–48 (not
discussing legal arguments); Rubin, supra note 29, at 522.
252. Hasen, supra note 3, at 194.
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seeking prescriptive goals within an interactive legislative process. It takes
useful insights from the political science literature on lobbyist strategies,
positions, and tactics and integrates them with legal scholars’
conceptualization of the legislative process as a lawmaking enterprise.253
Borrowing from sociolegal studies of judicial advocacy, I emphasize how
legislative advocacy is about the substance of the law and how legislative
advocates employ legal frames and arguments in the legislative process.254
By examining the various positions advocates take and the arguments they
make throughout the legislative process, my approach facilitates an in-depth
exploration of how advocates negotiate legislative lawmaking and interact
with legislators to craft the law through this dynamic, discursive process.
My analysis of American Indian advocacy serves as an illustrative
example of the utility and richness of this approach. It uncovers two key
insights about legislative advocacy that earlier approaches overlook. First,
my account shows that advocates perceive legislative advocacy to be about
modifying the substantive content of a proposed law. Recent political science
studies discount the importance of a bill’s substantive content by
emphasizing binary win/loss advocacy strategies. In contrast, my account
reveals that legislative advocates can—and frequently do—pursue a third
strategy: to modify the substantive text of a proposed law. Indian advocates
engaged in modification strategies, seeking to shape provisions in the
legislative text, on the majority—53%—of the bills in this study. 255 As
modifiers, Indian advocates advocated broadly, frequently providing input on
general laws as well as pan-tribal and tribe specific laws. Their advocacy
covered a variety of subject matters from health, housing, and nuclear waste
policy to water rights settlements and mineral resource development.
My data reveal that legislative advocates take a wider range of and more
flexible positions on proposed bills than previous political science studies
have suggested and that they use these positions strategically in their efforts
to change the law.256 The positions taken by Indian advocates varied from
proponents strongly for the bill to opponents strongly against, with several
options in between in which advocates sought to modify the legislative text.
Figure 5 displays the range of positions that legislative advocates take when
advocating on a proposed law.
Figure 5: Continuum of Positions of Indian Witnesses Advocating on a
Bill
253.
254.
255.
256.

See supra Part III.
See supra Part III.
See supra Part V.
See supra Part II.
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wider range of advocacy positions provides unique insights into advocate
behavior. It enables scholars to see aspects of legislative advocacy
overlooked by existing political science studies, which have emphasized
legislative advocacy as political rather than legal work.257 In contrast, my
account of Indian advocacy highlights how Indian advocates emphasize the
creation of legal texts in their advocacy and demonstrates how they use the
law in shaping these texts. Focusing on the text enabled Indian advocates to
interact with legislators to shape the law. As advocacy on the Older
Americans Act Amendments of 1981, the Federal Energy and Mineral
Resources Act of 1982, and the NAHASDA Amendments of 2000 shows,
Indian advocates frequently educated members of Congress on how existing
laws affected and could be improved to better serve the needs of Indian
country by arguing for changes to specific provisions in proposed laws.258
Indian advocates often acted strategically in taking positions on and
making arguments about proposed laws. Indian advocates frequently used
their position on a bill to negotiate legislative texts and were open to shifting
their positions as they interacted with legislators to craft laws. Consider how
the Osage Tribal Council and Tohono O’odham Nation navigated the
legislative process.259 Both tribes used their positions to negotiate for
provisions in proposed laws more responsive to their needs. By uncovering
these interactions among legislative advocates and legislators, my account
validates existing descriptive theories and studies that portray the legislative
process as dynamic and interactive. As a result, it produces a more accurate
description of how advocates treat the legislative process as a lawmaking
enterprise.260

257.
258.
259.
260.

See supra Part II.
See supra Part IV.
See supra Part IV.
See supra Part II.
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Second, my account of Indian advocacy emphasizes that legislative
advocacy is legal work. Recognizing modifiers and highlighting their role
within the legislative process illuminates the legal aspects of the legislative
process because modifiers are all about shaping the content of the proposed
law. Indian modifiers often targeted provisions of bills or used the legislative
process to negotiate and shape federal Indian policy more generally.
My examination of Indian advocacy also reveals that Indian advocates
perceived the law to be an important part of their advocacy. Indian
proponents, opponents, and modifiers frequently relied on legal frames,
especially those central to federal Indian law, and legal arguments to shape
proposed laws affecting their interests. While some Indian advocates made
cogent arguments about how proposed laws would undermine existing ones,
others used wider legal frames, such as the trust relationship between tribal
and federal governments, to educate members of Congress about their
sovereign status as governments and to justify their requests for changes to
proposed laws.
A few final observations suggest the broader implications of this legal
approach for advocacy studies, interest group studies, and legal scholars.
First, my research indicates that legal scholars need to rethink their reliance
on political science studies of legislative advocacy. A political science
framework underemphasizes the interactive and legal aspects inherent in the
legislative process. Congress is the primary author of federal law and, as this
study shows, should be viewed as potentially the most powerful legal
institution in the United States.261 Overlooking how legislative advocates
interact with legislators to craft statutory laws leaves legal scholars and
advocates with a limited view of the lawmaking process. It undermines their
ability to develop law reform strategies and prescriptive theories to improve
the law.
To facilitate scholars in rethinking legislative advocacy, this Article
presents an innovative, mixed-method approach for studying legislative
advocacy that produces richer and more accurate descriptions of how
advocates behave and use the law in legislative lawmaking. My account of
Indian advocacy demonstrates how legislative advocacy extends beyond
proponents and opponents by describing how legislative advocates
frequently act as modifiers, seeking to shape the law. Modification strategies
enabled Indian advocates to participate widely in the lawmaking process.
Indian modifiers used the legislative process to educate members of Congress
on a wide variety of subject matters and kinds of bills. This broader
description of legislative advocacy expands on existing studies by

261. Rudesill, supra note 13, at 700.
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uncovering how advocates view the legislative process as an opportunity to
negotiate legal texts. It also documents how advocates attempt to shape the
law even when they are not major participants or stakeholders on a proposed
bill.262 Indian modifiers often behaved strategically through the positions
they took even when they were not considered major stakeholders on a
proposed law. My legal approach, thus, devises a way for scholars to develop
more accurate descriptions of legislative advocacy by recognizing that the
legislative process is an interactive, lawmaking enterprise widely used by
legislative advocates to craft statutory laws.
A second important implication of my account is that it indicates that
scholars and advocates need to think more carefully and critically about how
legislative advocates act strategically to negotiate the legislative process
through the positions they take. The widespread use of modification
strategies by Indian advocates suggests that legislative advocates see the
legislative process as negotiable and relational.263 Contrary to recent political
science studies,264 legislative advocates do not always take binary or fixed
positions but frequently adapt their positions throughout the process in
response to their interactions with legislators and other political actors. My
account, thus, expands on recent studies of how legislative advocates act
strategically by documenting how, when, and why legislative advocates
adapt their positions throughout the legislative process in response to the
opportunities and constraints that arise.265 Importantly, it shows how Indian
modifiers sought to create their own opportunities to change the law through
the positions they took and the arguments they made about specific
provisions in a bill. Consider the sophisticated strategy used by the Three
Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation on Federal Energy and
Mineral Resources Act of 1982 as an example. The Tribes supported the
general goal of the bill to improve oversight of leasing of federal lands, but
they used the bill as an opportunity to address particular problems plaguing
the leasing of tribal lands and drew heavily on legal arguments to prevent
Congress from enacting sections that would further deprive tribes of revenues
generated from the leasing of their lands.266 Accounts that do not consider
the dynamic, interactive nature of the legislative process may overlook or
miss much of the strategic behavior that legislative advocates engage in
throughout the legislative process.

262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

BAUMGARTNER, ET AL., supra note 6, at 3.
ZIV, supra note 53, at 212–13.
See, e.g., BAUMGARTNER, ET AL., supra note 6, at 6–7; BURSTEIN, supra note 39, at 115.
BAUMGARTNER, ET AL., supra note 6, at 110–13.
See supra Part IV.
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Third, my findings may have significant implications for how scholars
and advocates think about the power groups have and how they exercise it
within the legislative process. Indian modifiers frequently leveraged what
power they had through their positions and arguments. They were able to
leverage their power more broadly than one would have expected possible
for a group that has almost no electoral clout and few political resources.267
Yet, Indian advocates leveraged their positions to shape the content of
proposed laws even when they were not major stakeholders on a bill. For
example, even though Indian elders constitute a very small percentage of the
elderly population in the United States, the NCAI used targeted advocacy on
the Older Americans Act Amendments of 1981 to improve programs for
elders in Indian country.268 While determining exactly how and why Indian
advocates were able to do this is beyond the scope of this Article, it raises
important questions about how our most accountable lawmaking institution
interacts with underrepresented groups. Previous studies have lamented the
inequalities of the lobbying system,269 but my research suggests that a deeper
look may reveal that underrepresented groups engage in the legislative
process more frequently or in different ways than scholars currently think,
and that Congress sometimes responds to them.270 Future studies could
reshape how scholars, advocates, and courts think about power and power
relationships.
My research also challenges scholars to think more carefully about how
legislative advocates use the status quo in their arguments and advocacy.
Scholars have long recognized the force of the status quo as an obstacle to
legal change in the legislative process.271 Recent political science studies
have emphasized the status quo as a tool used by opponents to defeat
proposed legislation.272 My investigation of American Indian advocacy,
however, calls into question whether these scholars have accurately described
how legislative advocates use arguments about the status quo.273 Indian
modifiers frequently sought to challenge the status quo yet made arguments
that highlighted the negative consequences that would occur if Congress
267. Carlson, Lobbying Against the Odds, supra note 16, at 45.
268. See supra Part IV.
269. BAUMGARTNER, ET AL., supra note 6, at 254-59; SCHLOTZMAN & TIERNEY, supra note 6,
at 311.
270. The examples in this study suggest that Indian modifiers frequently used texts to educate
members of Congress about the unique conditions and needs of Indian country. Members of
Congress appeared interested in learning about these needs and responding to them. A pernicious
side may exist to this in terms of rent-seeking by lobbyists for specialized interests, but my data
does not suggest that Indian advocates are engaged in rent-seeking.
271. BAUMGARTNER, ET AL., supra note 6, at 140; ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra note 54, at 25.
272. BAUMGARTNER, ET AL., supra note 6, at 140.
273. See supra Part II.

1020

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 80:960

enacted the proposed bill. These Indian modifiers emphasized the drawbacks
of the proposed bill not because they were defending the status quo but
because they wanted Congress to improve the bill to serve the needs of Indian
country more efficiently and effectively. My findings, thus, suggest that
scholars need to pay closer attention to the arguments being made by
legislative advocates and how they relate to the status quo.
A final important implication of this research is that it reveals that,
contrary to recent political science studies deemphasizing legislative
advocacy as legal work, legislative advocates perceive the law as an
important aspect of their legislative advocacy. Indian advocates often used
the law in their arguments for changes to legislative texts. In this respect, my
research expands on existing advocacy studies, which have emphasized how
and when legislative advocates make policy arguments, by demonstrating
that legal arguments also play a vital role in legislative lawmaking.
My research, thus, contributes to a growing literature on how advocates
use the law in non-judicial settings and suggests that advocacy scholars need
to think more carefully and critically about how advocates employ the law in
legislative settings. Contrary to the view that the law matters less in the
legislative process because legislators respond to policy arguments,274 the
law mattered to Indian advocates. They found the law to be a useful tool in
educating members of Congress about the special government-togovernment relationship between Indian nations and the federal government.
They employed legal arguments to persuade members of Congress to make
changes to proposed laws so that they would not undermine existing federal
laws, treaty rights, or tribal sovereignty.275 The fact that legislative advocates
take the law and legal arguments seriously as part of their advocacy suggests
that future studies should pay more attention to the kinds of legal frames and
arguments that advocates use in legislative settings and evaluate their
influence on legislators.
VI. CONCLUSION
Legislative advocacy has increased exponentially in the past five decades, yet
recent scholarship has overlooked the legal aspects of legislative lawmaking.
This Article responds to this gap in the literature by presenting an innovative,
mixed-methods approach to studying legislative lawmaking. My approach
improves on existing political science studies by emphasizing the legislative
process as a lawmaking enterprise. It highlights the importance of the
substantive content of laws to legislative advocates and their behavior. The
274. Rubin, supra note 29, at 522.
275. See supra Part V.
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Article then demonstrates the utility of a legal approach through an
investigation of American Indian advocacy, which reveals two important
insights about legislative advocates’ behavior overlooked in previous studies.
First, my account reveals that legislative advocates perceive legislative
advocacy as about modifying the substantive content of a proposed law. It
shows how Indian advocates engaged in nuanced and sophisticated strategies
to interact with legislators and other political actors to craft statutory laws.
Second, my account of Indian advocacy emphasizes that legislative advocacy
involves legal as well as political work. Indian advocates regularly used legal
frames and arguments to educate and persuade legislators.

